Updated 16 October 2007: Washington, DC -- In the past two weeks attacks by PKK rebels have heightened already existing tensions on the Turkish-Iraqi border resulting in a spiraling situation that may lead to a Turkish military operation into Northern Iraq. Exchanges between the Iraqi, U.S. and Turkish governments make it clear that this outcome could prove undesirable for all involved, yet a combination of factors is making it increasingly possible that military action will occur. The Turkish government has officially requested parliamentary approval for cross-border action and the military is already in preparation for a potential operation against PKK rebels in Kurdish dominated Northern Iraq.
However, Ankara remains undecided as to whether it will follow through
with unilateral measures immediately or wait for action by the U.S. and Iraqi forces to deal with the PKK. What is clear is that the Turkish government
will no longer tolerate the existing status quo. The upcoming parliamentary vote, which would authorize cross-border operations for one year, gives the military a free hand to pursue the PKK into Iraq. Given current public outcry over the deaths of soldiers and civilians in recent weeks, and a majority held by Erdogan’s party in parliament, it is almost certain this motion will
be approved.
What has been a long running conflict between a Kurdish insurgency, in
part based in bordering Iraq, and the Turkish military, has intensified with
15 soldiers killed in Sirnak province last week. Southeastern Turkey has
been the site of ongoing clashes as the army attempts to root out PKK rebels in Sirnak and seeks to pursue the insurgents across the border into their alleged staging areas in Iraq. Although accounts vary, roughly 80-100 Turkish soldiers have died this year in PKK attacks and the government claims that more than 3,000 PKK fighters are basing their operations out of Northern Iraq. A security cooperation pact signed in September between the two governments prevents Turkey from sending troops across the border, but the defense ministry continues to press for limited cross-border action in pursuit of rebels and is already staged to do so.
In the past year the military has grown increasingly frustrated from losses caused by PKK attacks and its inability to conduct operations against alleged bases just across the border. More importantly, the recent deaths have led to public furor that has added a domestic political element to the issue. Prime Minister Erdogan now faces accusations from opposition parties that his government is weak on terrorism and political pressure is mounting for a Turkish response. Turkey believes that the U.S. and Iraqi forces have done little to address its ongoing requests for a crackdown on the PKK and reporting by Turkish media has only served to increase public awareness of the situation. The past week has seen newspapers printing pictures and names of the dead soldiers from a PKK ambush, incensing the public and furthering calls for a military response.
Adding to the Turkish frustration is the current row over a vote by a House committee to label the mass killings of Armenians between 1915-17 as genocide. This has always been a particularly sensitive issue for Turkey and Ankara has clearly expressed its anger over the House vote by recalling its ambassador for a ten day period of “consultations.” Although this represents a measured response by the government, which remains a close ally of the U.S., members of both the military and the parliament have stated that if the full House votes to approve the genocide label it will have a serious impact on U.S.-Turkey relations. Two senior U.S. officials have been sent to Turkey in an attempt to temper Ankara’s response, but it remains to be seen whether their visit will have any impact. This Saturday the Turkish Minister of State cancelled his planned visit to the U.S. and it is questionable whether Turkey will continue to listen to State Department calls for restraint in dealing with the PKK. Undoubtedly the diplomatic row will have an impact on the upcoming vote in the Turkish parliament, but the U.S. Congress now appears to be backing off from a House vote on the measure, with key Democrats withdrawing their support.
Iraq continues to maintain its position that Turkey’s concerns over cross-border PKK operations should be addressed through the instruments of the recently signed pact between the two governments. Washington supports this position since a Turkish operation in Northern Iraq might serve to destabilize the only relatively peaceful area of the country and incite the Kurdish population there. However, while reasserting inter-governmental cooperation in dealing with the PKK, the agreement does not give the Turkish military the right to conduct cross-border operations, which was the primary ability it sought. The ramping up of military operations in Sirnak and a perceived lack of progress in dealing with Turkish concerns may make the security agreement worthless if the government chooses to proceed with unilateral action. Acknowledging the imminence of the situation, the Iraqi government has called for “urgent negotiations” and dispatched Vice-President Tareq Hashemi to Turkey in order to reach an understanding and moderate Ankara’s response. Iraqi officials have warned that a Turkish violation of the border could set a dangerous precedent for other neighboring countries to do the same.
Although Washington retains considerable influence in Turkey, which has been a long standing partner in the war on terror and key to the ongoing war in Iraq, its interest may not continue to outweigh the internal pressure on Erdogan for some sort of action. The Turkish military continues to be highly dependent on the U.S. defense industry, but over the years U.S. operations in Iraq have made this a shared dependence. The Washington Post recently reported that over 70% of U.S. air cargo to Iraq passes through Turkey, along with one third of all fuel for the U.S. forces there and other supplies for troops operating in the country. Turkey is also home of the Incirlik U.S. air base, critical to air operations and force projection in the region. Thus, Turkey may not be as inclined to give in to U.S. demands for continued patience, as Washington’s dependency on the continued military support of its ally makes it crucial to its efforts in Iraq.
Erdogan still has several options, and although the current situation bears the appearance of a spiraling crisis it could also be little more than saber rattling. Washington now must choose whether it will immediately take measures to placate Turkey or instead permit a limited incursion into Northern Iraq that would infuriate the Iraqi government, but in the end might serve as the best outcome for all involved. A limited operation, agreed to by the U.S. and an unwilling Iraqi government, would calm the Turkish public and prevent escalation that could lead to more drastic actions. Both the government and the military leadership in Ankara knows that a major military operation against hidden PKK bases in Northern Iraq would at best be indecisive while damaging its relations with the U.S. and potentially inciting Iraqi Kurds into greater support for the PKK.
Erdogan may choose to take other measures, such as closing Turkey's southern border and suspending all trade and travel with Iraq in order to buy Washington more time to deal with the PKK, while himself appearing to have taken action in response to domestic demands. At the moment he is keeping all options on the table and states that parliamentary approval “does not mean an immediate incursion will follow.” For now, the only clear certainty is that Turkey has the full attention of both Washington and Baghdad, with the PKK problem at the center of the agenda.
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