21 April 2008: A new phantom threatens the Balkans, a region rich with inter-state disputes and political and diplomatic intrigue. This time, it is Greece and Macedonia—deadlocked in a political conflict over what the Macedonians can call themselves.

This cold conflict cost Macedonia an invitation to join NATO. The country now risks entering a period of internal political obscurity with its Parliament dissolved and new elections declared for June 1, 2008. On the other side, Greece’s aggressive foreign policy has raised anti-Greece sentiments within Macedonia and commenced a boycott of everything Greek.

At first sight, this is a conflict between two states, where on one side Macedonia firmly affirms its right to be called based on the constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” as free expression of its own people’s will, while, on the other side, Greece asserts monopoly over the name “Macedonia.”

But nothing in the Balkans can be resolved or analyzed at first sight.

The name dispute between the two Balkan neighbors originates from the early 1990s—immediately after Macedonia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. Greece responded to Macedonia’s newfound independence by protesting its name, declaring it implied a territorial claim on Greece's Northern Province that has the same name. To prove their point, Greece blocked recognition of the emancipated state in international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union.

Greece based its argument on three conditions: On Macedonia’s constitutional guarantees against claims to Greek territory, an end to hostile propaganda against Greece, and exclusion of the term “Macedonia” from the new state’s name.

The first of the three conditions was a response to Article 49 of Macedonia’s 1991 constitution, which stated that “The Republic has a concern for the status and rights of persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries, as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists in their cultural development and promotes links with them.” Article 49 is almost identical to article 108 of the Greek constitution. Yet, the reference to Macedonian peoples in “neighboring countries” was interpreted by Greece as an indirect reference to a Macedonian minority within Greece. 

As a result of Greece’s pressure and its enormous influence in international organizations as a UN, EU, and NATO member, Macedonia finally became a UN member on the April 8, 1993 but under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM (UN Resolution 817). And despite the fact that as many as 120 states have recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name, the country is still using the “FYROM” acronym as its name in international organizations.

The subsequent Greek pressure, including an embargo on imports from the port of Thessalonica, was temporarily downsized by the Interim Accord between the two sides on September 13, 1995, which made Macedonia change its flag and some constitutional provisions—including an addendum to Paragraph one of Article 49 that “In the exercise of these concerns the Republic will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internal affairs”—in order to be recognized by Greece in return. This agreement, achieved under the auspices of the United Nations and its envoys Cyrus Vance and Matthew Nimitz, was considered to be temporary until a final solution about the name is agreed by both parties.

However, in pursuing her policies toward Macedonia, through its use of veto in NATO’s Summit Greece violated the Interim Accord of 1995 between the two countries, which contains a clause that binds Greece not to object to the application by or the membership of Macedonia in international organizations and institutions (Article 11 of the Interim Accord) under the name FYROM. Macedonian media recently reported that Greece didn’t ratify the 1995 Interim Accord, thus remaining unbound by it.     

Three are the intentions that stand behind Greece’s refusal to recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name. First, Greece refuses to recognize Macedonian national identity and considers the Macedonian nation an “artificial creation of Tito.” Such a stance is supported by Greece’s assertion that ancient Macedonia’s heritage and specifically that of Alexander the Great are essential ingredients of Greek ethno-symbolic identification and history.

Greece has continuously felt insulted and provoked by Macedonia’s appropriation of the figure of Alexander the Great and ancient Macedonia’s heritage, claiming Greek exclusivity to the historic heritage. So, when Macedonia decided to rename its international airport in Skopje after Alexander the Great (despite the fact that there hardly could be found any connection between ancient Macedonians and today’s Macedonian nation) in December 2006, Greece considered this act as overt provocation.

In this context, the dispute is more about appropriation of history and identity than just about a name. Behind Greece’s attempts to force Macedonia to change its name there stands an effort to destroy the cornerstone of the Macedonian nation and its modern national identity—which in itself is largely built around the concept of territory known as “Macedonia” and the name “Macedonian”.

Second, Greece is anxious that a stronger Macedonian state—member of NATO and EU—may revive the issue of Macedonians living in northern Greece and those expelled from northern Greece after World War II. If Macedonia decides to make good of its Article 49 in the future, Greece feels it has reasons to fear irredentist activity against its own territory.

But, by claiming potential future irredentism Greece is avoiding an open confrontation with its bitter past—tens of thousands of Albanians, Macedonians, Turks, and Jews were expelled by the Greek state during and after World War II. At the same time, Greece continues to resolutely negate the existence of non-Greek ethnic groups (national minorities) within its state borders.

Third, by vetoing Macedonia’s membership in NATO and maybe in the EU—the Greek Foreign Minister warned Macedonia that if no mutual agreement is found until December, Greece will prevent Macedonia in getting closer to EU membership—Greece hopes to bring about political crises within Macedonia, something that will weaken its position in UN-sponsored negotiations about the name. Indeed, Macedonia’s failure to receive an invitation to join NATO brought the country on the eve of a political crisis as parliament was dissolved and new elections were declared.

This situation may have further implications, especially in inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. Most probably, Macedonia will postpone its act of recognition of Kosovo due to the fall of government, something that will dissatisfy Albanian parties in Macedonia who are urging and pushing for an immediate recognition.

The name dispute between Macedonia and Greece is only the tip of a much larger iceberg. In fact, the dispute—which is about historical past, identity, heritage and territory—risks driving the Balkans backward. The international community is also divided in the issue with France and most European powers supporting Greece and the U.S. supporting Macedonia’s right to self-identification.

Is history repeating itself in the Balkans? As countries continue to argue over history, identity, and symbols—and great powers align themselves in opposing aisles depending on their own interests—the Balkans become once again a field for political football at the pricy expense of peace and development.