July 2, 2008 – Washington, DC
These conversations are about getting to know one another. You can discuss anything you like—we just ask that you be respectful. Our volunteers are… people like you who want to find out more about someone in another country.
With those words printed on the back of a miniature cardboard, a declaration of peace was made. On June 10, on the west terrace of the Cannon House Office Building in Washington, DC, three white tables manned by interpreters stood ready to connect curious Americans and eager Iranians in sometimes awkward, occasionally halting, decidedly scintillating conversations.
 Participant speaks to an Iranian in Tehran.
As part of a larger grassroots diplomatic initiative entitled “It’s Time to Talk to Iran,” the discussions were preceded by a press conference whereby politicians and activists advocated “a diplomatic surge for peace and reconciliation.” Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA), her usually calm features tensed with determination, thundered, “It is time to put an end to [an American-Iranian policy marked by threats and fear-mongering]… The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King said that ‘we must learn to live together as brothers or we will surely perish together as fools.’ It is time to talk to Iran. All it takes to begin is one ‘Hello.’” Others seconded Rep. Lee’s sentiments, alternately describing diplomatic engagement with Iran as a “mission of mercy” to unfortunate Iranian citizens.
Underlying these passionate statements was the premise that engaging Iran militarily would represent a devastating political, economic, and humanitarian loss for the United States preceded by a “tragic series of lost opportunities.” According to former Georgia representative and current Libertarian presidential candidate Bob Barr, American “strategic and tactical interests” in the Middle East could not bear the loss of benefits from a better relationship with Iran. However, two questions lingered: what kind of “strategic and tactical” significance did Iran actually have and what could grassroots diplomacy do in an escalating conflict of hard rhetoric?
Flanked by Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., and Rep. Lynn Woolsey, D-Calif., former Georgia representative and Libertarian presidential nominee Bob Barr advocates diplomatic engagement with Iran.
In reality, Iran’s geographic location and considerable oil resources make it paramount to America’s interests. Nearly 40 percent of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow Persian Gulf waterway on Iran’s western coast—on a daily basis. In the event of an American military attack, the Iranian government could easily blockade this strait, interrupting the flow of oil. Oil and natural gas comprise 80 percent of Iranian exports. For the U.S. that suffers from rising oil prices, antagonizing a potential source of much needed relief would be tantamount to curing athlete’s foot by amputating the patient’s feet. Renewed relations with Iran open up the possibility of an increased supply of oil resulting from American-Iranian trade, which could lower prices and replenish the amount of disposable income available to the average American.
Although current sanctions do not include oil, the fact remains that the Iranian government has a persistent fear of enforced regime change at America’s hands. As long as that apprehension exists, a potential Iranian-American oil trade will never materialize. Representative Lee’s bill, the Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (HR 770) attempts to mitigate those fears by blocking the use of funds for regime change. However, this latest round of sanctions does not complement the message that this pending piece of legislation is trying to send.
From a diplomatic perspective, improved American-Iranian relations could also translate into a more stable Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to the mutual mistrust that the Bush and Ahmadinejad administrations seemed to have settled into, Iran was actually a central player in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. For example, Iranian-American cooperation predominated in both meetings of the United Nations-sponsored 6+2 Group on Afghanistan in the late 1990s and in the 2002 Bonn meetings to develop the incipient Hamid Karzai government in the wake of the Taliban’s overthrow. On the ground in Afghanistan, Iran even supported ground forces and helped negotiate the Northern Alliance. Unfortunately, these overtures were later repelled by Iran’s inclusion in the “Axis of Evil.”
In Iraq, the supplanting of Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian Sunni regime with a coalition of Shiite parties favorable to Tehran has complicated American efforts to win hearts and minds and made the overall political atmosphere more amenable to Iranian meddling, which has manifested itself in alleged funding of Shiite militia groups bent on guerilla campaigns against American troops. A new spirit of cooperation in Iran and America’s mutual support for the Al-Maliki administration could help reduce the ethnic and sectarian schisms in Iraq by depriving many of these militias of their financial support and ideological rationale for attacking American soldiers.
Technically, sanctions are proving to be diplomatically ineffectual. To counteract strategies to undercut its nuclear program, Tehran has waged a diplomatic offensive aimed at Russia, China, and its neighbors in the Middle East. Iran’s readiness to share its oil exports with diplomatically receptive and energy-hungry nations has generated hesitation on the part of the Chinese and the Russians—two prominent members of the UN Security Council—to engage in sanctions against the Ahmadinejad administration. The December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluding that Iran ceased its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003 has further exacerbated Russia and China’s reluctance to actively support sanctions.
Iran’s support for Hezbollah has proven its spoiler potential in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Although “the precise extent of coordination between Tehran and Hezbollah” remains uncertain, “circumstantial evidence” exist showing Iran ordered Hezbollah to launch a 2006 incursion into Israeli territory that prompted a protracted military strike. Continued Iranian patronage of Hezbollah ensures a prolonged risk to Israeli welfare. If a military strike was launched against Iran, Tehran could use its considerable influence over Hezbollah to retaliate with a proxy attack on Israel. Given Iran’s newfound respect in the Arab world, American aggression could also prompt terror attacks against U.S. citizens, not to mention whatever conventional force Iran could shore up to respond in kind.
Amidst all these nightmare scenarios, one can only marvel at the audacity of grassroots diplomacy activists. How can such small initiatives like the “Talk to Iran” campaign reverse the tide of mistrust and missed opportunities plaguing American-Iranian relations? According to Carah Ong of the Center for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, the answer lies in humanization of those who have been demonized. “The whole point of these actions,” she says, “is to put a human face on the other [and amplify] the voices of those who say we need diplomacy. If the people [remain] silent, then governments continue what they are doing.” In contrast to the vitriol that has characterized American-Iranian relations since the 1950s, the “Talk to Iran” campaign relies on direct communication as a means of reversing stereotypes created by media exaggeration and political rhetoric. Telephone calls between American and Iranian citizens are arranged as a means of creating friendships and “replacing caricatures with real people.”
Another purpose of cultural diplomatic campaigns like “Talk to Iran” is to complement official and Track Two diplomacy methods used by mid-level and elite sectors of American and Iranian society. In a March 20, 2008 joint article for the New York Review of Books, former UN Ambassador Thomas Pickering, MIT nonproliferation specialist Jim Walsh, and William Luers revealed that a series of secret meetings between “former American diplomats and regional experts and Iranian academics and policy advisers” over five years had produced a proposal to conduct Iran’s nuclear enrichment program within an international consortium. Under this multilateral effort, Iran would choose other nations to participate in the management and operation of its nuclear facilities. No work would be pursued outside the arrangement, nor could Iran produce highly enriched uranium or processed plutonium. Instead, Iran would commit to a light water reactor program that required small levels of enriched uranium, not enough to build a weapon. All parties would contribute financially and share in the revenues.
In the larger scheme of things, cultural diplomacy would help encourage such a policy and official initiatives calling for restraint in American-Iranian policy by inspiring ordinary Americans and Iranians to agitate for better communication and working relations in increasing numbers. As cultural peace evolved into economic peace, a rapprochement in political relations could result. As such, peace with Iran would resemble a large multilevel initiative encompassing all sectors of American and Iranian society beginning with calls for peace from the bottom up.
Unfortunately, that vision remains a pipe dream. Despite a May 13, 2008 proposal from Iran’s Ambassador to the UN endorsing the consortium plan, the European Union, Britain, and the U.S. are “intensifying financial pressure” against Iran by freezing its largest commercial bank’s overseas assets. The inevitable result of this latest pressure move is that Iran will most likely “shift its trade from Europe to Asia.” For a region that is suffering from the perception of fuel shortages, the loss of a potential fuel source may prove to be a significant barrier that will fail to produce the desired effect of compliance, as Iran can “use its windfall oil revenue and pay further costs to import through smaller banks.”
Diplomatic Courier reporter Cassandra Newman speaks to an Iranian student in Tehran. |
