24 June 2008 – Tel Aviv, Israel: Newspaper headlines have been peppered with mention of indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations mediated by Turkey. For the first time since direct talks stalled in 2000, Israeli and Syrian officials publicly acknowledge having resumed discussions over a future bi-national settlement. However, in a departure from the norm, the United States is neither facilitating nor publicly supporting the process. Turkish officials have stepped up as the third party able and willing to bring the two sides together.

Turkey is among few countries in the region that can boast positive and active relations with both Israel and Syria, as well as with the United States and with Europe.

Geographically situated in a region marked by constant interstate and intrastate conflict, Turkey has continually struggled with how to define its own identity in the context of its history, neighborhood, and national aspirations. Since its inception in 1924, Turkish policy-making has been guided by an interest in separating the country from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, securing it amidst volatile regional politics, and steering it toward the West as a secular-democratic country, according to the ideals of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The political and policy implications of these aims were interpreted in different ways by different leaders, at times pushing Turkey toward the Arab world, at times toward to Israel, and fairly consistently toward Europe. Until recently, the military was considered the guarantors of secularism, able to quickly intervene—whether forcefully or peacefully—when they deemed leaders in violation of Kemalist principles. In response to demands from the European Union regarding conditions for Turkish accession, the military seems to have stepped back from the political scene. Despite internal tensions, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a political party with religious roots, has maintained stable rule since 2001.

While the degree to which Turkish-Israeli relations have been publicized or improved upon has varied, some form of association has been sustained since shortly after Israel’s independence in 1948. Israel has been a part of the West since its inception, and in accord with Ataturk’s ideals of secularism, Westernism, and modernization, Turkey has always sought relations with the West—at times, with the help of Israel. According to Oxford scholar Philip Robins, Turkey was drawn to Israel partially because of similarities in political cultures, relative to the others in their region. While neither country is Arab, both are geographically located in the Middle East, the center of the Arab world, and both have a history of contention with many of their neighbors. Both Israel and Turkey are democracies with parliamentary governments, and both share a strong relationship and identification with the West. Both states face domestic situations that demand consideration of the balance between religion and secularism in their national political identities. 

The Turkish-Israeli relationship has been cited as an alliance, an alignment, and a partnership. However it is classified, Turkey’s engagement with Israel has been strategically, politically, and economically valuable for both countries. Regional events, including the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 War in Iraq, have impacted Turkish attitudes toward Israel, both political and popular, as well as toward the United States, but the relationship has never been derailed.

Bilateral relations with Syria have had a more volatile history than relations with Israel. Turkey and Syria have historically had territorial disputes over the Hatay Province, over water rights to the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and over Syrian support for Kurdish insurgency, namely the PKK. 

Diplomatic tension between Turkey and Syria over Syrian support for the PKK had a significant impact on Turkish-Israeli relations. In the 1990s, when Syria was an enemy of both Turkey and Israel, the perceived need for a strategic alignment to protect and strengthen Turkey against Syria was an important incentive for the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. As ties between Israel and Turkey continued to grow, relations between Turkey and Syria became tenser. Not only did Turkey object to Syrian support for the PKK, but Syria had been giving asylum to Abdullah Ocalan, founder and leader of the PKK for nearly two decades, despite Turkish disapproval.  In 1997, in the face of brutal PKK insurgency, Turkey demanded that Ocalan be extradited from Syria into the hands of Turkish authorities. In 1998, under pressure from Israel and Turkey, and threat of military invasion into Syrian territory if it did not comply, Syria agreed to release Ocalan to Turkey. It is questionable whether Syria would have done so had it not been subject to threats from Israel and Turkey together. Relations between Syria and Turkey have been significantly better since this incident.

Today, when Turkey is on good terms with both Israel and Syria, a Syrian-Israeli rapprochement is in Turkish interest. Also, the role of mediator allows Turkey to show off its influence in the region, even if negotiations fail. As early as January 2005, when Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul traveled to Israel, he emphasized the need for a peaceful settlement between Israel and all its neighbors, including Lebanon and Syria, and offered Turkey’s services as a mediator for negotiations toward such an agreement. At the time, there was much skepticism and doubt among Turkish and Israeli academics, publics, and diplomats regarding whether Turkey had the power, clout, or capabilities to successfully mediate between the two countries. Turkey has clearly proven that is has the ability to bring the two sides together; to what end, is yet to be seen.

Turkey, Israel, and Syria share mutual interests in neighborhood stability, but also in access to water and energy resources. Turkey is the only of the three with excess water, which it shares with both Turkey and Syria under negotiated agreements. There has been discussion of a Turkish-Syrian energy alignment. Both Turkey and Syria share interest in a stable Iraq at the borders, with Turkey particularly concerned over containing Kurdish separatism and the PKK. Although Syria shares close relations with Iran, none of the three parties want to see a nuclear Iran. A Syrian-Israeli rapprochement may be able to positively impact Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, as Syria may hold influence over Hamas, among other factors. On the Israeli domestic political scene, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has an interest in making progress in all tracks of negotiations, not only for the sake of Israeli national security, but some suspect also to divert attention from personal scandals.

Nonetheless, according to public statements thus far, Syria is not willing to cut ties with Hezbollah or with Iran, and Israel is not willing to part with the Golan, both preconditions for settlement, if not even for direct negotiations. Only time will tell how far this fragile process will lead, but in the meantime all parties involved have to gain from taking part.