18 June 2008: The United States today stands at a crossroads in Iraq; it can choose to remain in Iraq indefinitely, maintaining the Bush Administration’s vow not to “cut and run,” or it can decide to begin withdrawing troops, either immediately or in stages over the next couple of years. The question of which of these paths the U.S. will take depends in large part on which of the two candidates, John McCain or Barack Obama, wins the presidential election this November.

Although the wisdom of invading Iraq in the first place was debated endlessly during the primary season, comparatively little time has been devoted to assessing the situation on the ground today. Is Iraq on a path to recovery and in need of some form of U.S. troop support indefinitely, as Senator McCain has suggested, or is Senator Obama correct in arguing that Iraq is simply descending further into an endless cycle of violence and anarchy? The mainstream media’s coverage of Iraq over the past few months has been largely confined to playing sound clips of the candidates’ purported positions on—and previous authorizations of—the war, while recent significant political and economic developments in Iraq have gone largely unreported. The debate on Iraq needs to be reframed as one that focuses on the future, rather than the past. Put another way, which potential course of action in the near future will permit the United States to pull out and focus on its own domestic needs, while still allowing the U.S. to meet most, if not all, of its goals in the country and region? This, of course, depends on how one understands the situation on the ground in Iraq today, and where it is likely to be headed in the near future.

Contrary to much of the accepted popular opinion on the subject, there is some significant progress being made in Iraq today. The government of Nuri al-Maliki has defied the expectations of even some of its harshest critics and finally seems to have found it own voice. Prime Minister al-Maliki has targeted the once-pervasive Sunni-led insurgency as well as the rag-tag militias of his fellow Shiite countrymen in Basra and the slums of Sadr City. This, in and of itself, is a positive sign that Iraq is slowly moving towards a post-sectarian political future, albeit one still marked by many question marks and unhelpful  political maneuvering. The fact that Iraq today enjoys relative stability in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province, in much of the Shiite south, and in the Kurdish northeast is a testament to how far the Iraqi government has come since the immediate post-war period. Progress in the Middle East is often measured in inches. One should not let the American “24/7 round-the-clock news culture” determine the pace of progress in a country as deeply wounded and politically-fractured as Iraq. Iraq will take years, if not decades, to fully heal after bearing witness to a half-century of mayhem and destruction.

There is also significant progress being made on the economic front in Iraq. Rather than becoming the liberal, free market haven that the Bush Administration initially planned it to be, Iraq has begun to find its own organic path to economic resurrection via more traditional, state-led models of growth. The Iraqi government recently began awarding contracts to refurbish and rebuild its industrial state-owned enterprises that once employed much of the Iraqi populace. Indeed, one of the domestic sectors booming today is the construction industry, a staple of these once mighty state-owned giants. Iraq’s cement plants can barely keep up with demand as housing construction sprouts up throughout the country. While far from ideal in many Westerners’ eyes, this top-down protectionist approach to the economic revitalization of Iraq may be the country’s best bet for the time being. In a situation where security and safety concerns prevent multinationals, and even many expatriate and local Iraqis, from investing in the country, a state-led approach may be the most practical way to begin employing much of the skilled and unskilled labor in Iraq. At the same time, this will signal to other hesitant investors that the Iraqi government is now invested in the future of the country, with its substantial oil revenues enabling it to act as a sort of guarantor of last resort.

Iraq has also begun to witness the beginnings of substantial foreign interest. Investors the world over are being drawn to Iraq’s abundant natural resources, its relatively skilled and technically-proficient populace, and the numerous opportunities for massive growth and lucrative financial returns in its many underdeveloped markets. DAMAC, a UAE-based real estate developer, recently announced a $15 billion dollar mixed-use residential and commercial development near Irbil in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. While Kurdistan benefits from a more stable investing climate than in the rest of Iraq, the launching of a project of this magnitude by a company based in the Arab world signals the region’s acceptance of the new political and social order in Iraq. Indeed, it appears that many in the Middle East have finally begun to see the full potential of an Iraq free from the constraints on trade that were a hallmark of the deposed regime’s economic policies.

Notwithstanding all of the positive developments, however, Iraq still faces major political, economic and social problems that are impeding comprehensive reform and rehabilitation of the country. Corruption, and not terrorism, remains the single biggest obstacle standing in the way of a fully-functioning government. Iraq today ranks amongst the most corrupt nations in the world and its bulging government coffers mask the inadequate progress that it has made in spending the recent oil windfall efficiently on the pressing needs of its people. Terror, of course, still figures prominently amongst the many problems afflicting the nation. Much of the citizenry, however, has turned decisively against the perpetrators of indiscriminate bloodshed and chaos. Indeed, the vast majority of religiously-inspired terrorists in Iraq operate with very little domestic support, even from groups that once championed their “resistance” struggle.

Iraq also faces a potentially-crippling crisis of identity. Under Saddam, the country’s role as “ultimate defender of the Arab world” was clearly communicated to its people and the wider region. Though this narrow characterization of Iraq by the regime led to the commission of many atrocities against its neighbors and its own people, it did manage to cement at least a superficial sense of nationalism and pride in ordinary Iraqis that is wholly absent today. Iraq needs desperately to reinvent itself, to set its own terms as to what role it intends to play in the Middle East and beyond.

In this respect, the politics of Iraq often differ little from those of the United States’: politicians are apt to say anything to appeal to the base instincts of the masses, rather than lay out some of the sacrifices that must be made in order to set the country on a path towards true political and economic revival. In other words, Iraq needs its fair share of truly inspirational and devoted political leaders, patriots who will engage in a difficult but necessary dialogue with their Iraqi kin while at the same time carving out a new and broadly-acceptable Iraqi identity that remains proud while not arrogant, and respectful but not weak.

This last bit, of course, depends a great deal on luck. The best thing that the United States can do in the near future is to ensure that Iraq has at least the opportunity to find its own voice and potentially transformative regional and national political leaders. To achieve this Iraq needs continued U.S. support in order to successfully wage free and fair elections for the third time in its history. A smooth set of elections will reaffirm Iraq’s permanent shift to a country of democratic principles where power rests not in a single sovereign, but rather eternally in the people.

An immediate withdrawal from Iraq is not, nor should be, a reasonable option. What should be open to debate, however, is what to do in the medium- to long-term. Domestic considerations, including the need to distribute the United States’ limited government revenues more effectively to its own ailing populace, dictate that the U.S. ought not to remain in Iraq in the long-term. Indeed, once another democratic transition occurs in Iraq, and assuming no significant interruptions of the recent economic progress being made in the country, the United States should seriously contemplate adopting a timeline to begin withdrawing its overstretched troops from Iraq. This would give the Iraqis the opportunity to begin having a serious national dialogue about their own future, while gradually freeing up funds in the United States to be spent on underfunded domestic programs and neglected constituencies.

Assuming business as usual in Iraq, at least as it has been defined over the past year or so throughout the “surge,” an ideal scenario would have the United States remaining fully-invested in Iraq for the next year or so, with gradual withdrawals beginning sometime in late 2009 after provincial and parliamentary elections set for this year and the next, respectively, are held in the country. It would seem, then, that Senators McCain and Obama are both right, albeit each only in part: the surge and the accompanying political and economic progress in Iraq have been a clear success for both Iraq and the U.S. That success, however, presents a convenient opportunity for the United States to begin withdrawing troops in the near future. The U.S. should not force Iraq to allow the building of permanent bases throughout the country, as this would only reinforce the perceived neo-colonialist role that the United States plays in the minds of many in the Arab world. Permanent bases in Iraq give the U.S. very little from a geostrategic point of view while providing ample fodder for anti-American extremists seeking new recruits to their causes. Indeed, U.S. interests in the region, including the maintenance of safe oil shipping routes, the containment of Iran, and a platform to keep local extremist militants in check, are already being well-served by other substantial U.S. military bases in the region.

It is time for both U.S. presidential candidates to move on from trading meaningless accusations over past votes on authorizations of the Iraq war. They both need instead to begin formulating detailed strategies that continue to nurture the political and economic progress that has been made in Iraq, which should in turn allow the United States to begin withdrawing troops in the medium-term on conditions favorable to its own goals in the country and region. Senator McCain should not let the past year’s progress in Iraq fool him into complacency that the status quo for U.S. forces there is anything but unsustainable. Senator Obama needs to lay out a comprehensive strategy on just how, when, and under what circumstances he is prepared to begin responsibly withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq over the next half-decade.