30 May 2008: FARC leader Manuel Marulanda’s recent death and last week’s surrender of powerful FARC commander Nelly Avila Moreno have dealt significant blows to an already beleaguered organization, and has further emboldened Colombian President Alvaro Uribe in his war against the guerillas. His death and her surrender, as well as her subsequent pleas for continuing disarmament, have come at an especially advantageous time for the Uribe administration. These unexpected windfalls, coupled with the successful, if controversial, raid into Ecuadorian territory in pursuit of Raul Reyes, FARC’s second in command, and the murder of rebel commander Ivan Rios, have left the rebels in the worst crisis in four decades.

This most recent blow to the group has left some wondering whether FARC is in an irreversible decline, perhaps even in its death throes. Moreno herself has acknowledged that the group is fractured, and there is no doubt that FARC is weaker now than it was even a year ago. According to Colombian government sources as many as 500 rebels have already been killed this year, not to mention the over 800 additional rebels who have turned themselves in, reciting a litany of reasons ranging from hunger to simple fear. The guerilla army, which used to boast some 17,000 combatants, has dwindled to around 10,000. Marulanda’s death and the surrender of Moreno—better known as Karina—have dropped the guerrillas’ morale to an all time low.

This turn of events has served Uribe well. Following the May 1st raid in which Reyes was killed, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had a field day, and the diplomatic fallout was instantaneous. Venezuela and Ecuador responded to the death by severing formal relations, and the international community condemned the maneuver as a clear violation of international law. The entire affair was touted as a political victory for Chavez at Uribe’s expense.  The reality, however, is starkly different. The computer files discovered during the raid that linked the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments to FARC have since been authenticated by Interpol, and the political fallout that was initially reserved for Uribe has landed squarely in Chavez’s lap. The affair has caught out Chavez in an exercise of undeniable hypocrisy, and further exposed FARC’s ever-growing weakness.

This is not to say, however, that the FARC no longer holds cards. The group so far has refused to release several American contractors, as well as its most high profile hostage, Colombian politician and French citizen Ingrid Betancourt. So far, negotiations for their release have failed and as long as the Uribe administration maintains its hard line stance against the guerillas and the weaker the FARC grows with few alternatives remaining to influence events, it is unlikely they will give up their only card left; the hostages. And, with the recent string of victories against FARC, the government is unlikely to relent. 

While the May 1st raid exposed Ecuador and Venezuela’s direct complicity in efforts to further destabilize Colombia—allowing FARC to operate outside Colombian territory and out of reach of government forces—the subsequent threats of military confrontation from Venezuela are sure to curb Uribe’s desire for more cross border maneuvers in the foreseeable future. FARC may use this time to regroup.

It has become abundantly clear—as Colombia has increased the effectiveness with which it has hunted the group—that the fate of FARC lies in the hands of its leftist brethren in the region, most importantly Hugo Chavez. Its dwindling ranks, diminished resources, and increasingly fractured communication network have made it easier pickings for government forces than was formerly the case, and without the support of the Venezuelan government, it might already have withered and died. So far, Chavez’s rhetorical support for the FARC has been unapologetic and very public, and evidence now shows that more tangible support has been supplied as well. 

For the first time, it seems possible that this level of commitment to FARC is no longer feasible for Chavez. FARC has almost no public backing in the region, especially within Colombia, and Chavez himself has been treading on ever thinning ice following his failed December 2007 referendum. However, there is no guarantee that Venezuela will discontinue clandestine support to the rebel group. After all, Chavez has based his political career on confrontation with the United States and the west, and may calculate that to be more politically advantageous rather than damaging (that he might suffer from aiding an increasingly unpopular terrorist group).

It is doubtful that FARC will simply surrender and lay down its arms, if for no other reason than inertia. After forty years, this generation of fighters will be reluctant to end its ostensible political struggle or its relationship with the drug trade, despite its increasing futility. The grim reality is that as long as there are men like Chavez who are willing to sacrifice regional peace and security for a tattered cause, in service of his own leftist ends, the FARC will continue to be a dangerous irritant, even if it no longer has the power to threaten a government that has problems enough without it.