16 May 2008: The collective sigh of relief could be heard from Berlin to Ljubljana.

Smashing even the most optimistic expectations, pro-western forces romped to an unexpected victory on May 11 in Serbia’s first parliamentary elections following the loss of Kosovo. Preliminary projections show the Alliance for a European Serbia taking some 39% of the vote and 103 seats in the 250-member National Assembly. The pro-EU Alliance, led by President Boris Tadic’s reformist Democratic Party in coalition with the liberal-conservative G17+ and several minor parties, had been credited with just under one-third of voting intentions in opinion polls leading up to the vote.

Trailing the European camp was the ultra-nationalist Radical Party with 29% and a disappointing 77 mandates. The Radicals, widely tipped to emerge as the strongest parliamentary faction, will find the result a bitter pill to swallow following a narrow loss to Tadic in February’s presidential election.

Yet, there has remained cause for tepid celebration in the Radical camp. Following the reformists and ultra-nationalists, current Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s national-conservative party (somewhat confusingly named the Democratic Party of Serbia) emerged in third place with 30 seats. More importantly, the Socialist Party, Slobodan Milosevic’s former political outfit, will have a pivotal 20 seats in the new parliament. The three parties, all generally pro-Russia and nationalistic, could form a theoretical coalition government with a bare majority of 127 seats; 126 seats are required to form a majority administration.

While Mr. Kostunica has formed government with Tadic’s party in the past, the two men have never gotten on well. Kostunica has humiliated and politically outmaneuvered Tadic on numerous occasions; stubbornly demanding the premiership even when his party was strongly outpolled by the president’s forces. Kostunica’s jealously guarded role as parliamentary kingmaker, coupled with endless threats to bolt and form a government with the Radicals, forced the president into an awkward, submissive role for years.

No longer. Kosovo’s declaration of independence formalized the split between the two men. Tadic’s drive to deepen ties with the EU despite the decision of most member states to recognize Kosovo offended his prime minister’s most basic nationalist instincts. Accordingly, Kostunica dissolved the coalition in March, prompting early elections.

Mr. Tadic may come to regret his new assertiveness. Despite topping the polls, his pro-western alliance remains far short of the 126 seats it needs for a majority. Its most likely coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, barely scraped in over the electoral threshold and will control only 13 seats. Furthermore, a spurned Kostunica has hinted that his coalition preference lay with the nationalist camp, eliminating his party as an outside choice for the pro-Europeans. Tadic would be unlikely anyway to make the concessions necessary to coax his erstwhile ally back on-side, having effectively ruled out offering the premiership to Kostunica. 

Surprisingly, speculation has now turned to Milosevic’s Socialists.

The party of Serbia’s late iron-fisted dictator is now seen as the most viable coalition option for the pro-western bloc. Although long viewed as a pariah or worse in most EU capitals, the Socialist Party now find itself embraced by the European Union as a critical player in the formation of a western-leaning Serbian coalition. Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy chief, appears to have given the green-light to Socialist participation in a Tadic-led coalition.

Socialist leader Ivica Dacic has so far refused to state a preference between teaming up with the reformists or the nationalists; a significant development, as the Socialists were long seen as natural partners for the Radicals. And, while Milosevic’s former party may share little ideological common ground with the pro-western reformers with whom it appears to be flirting, the allure of cabinet posts and international respect may prove too tempting to turn away.  

Serbia is in for a difficult period of coalition negotiations. In the end, President Tadic is likely to offer what is necessary to bring the Socialists on-board. In doing so, he may find his past difficulties with Kostunica trivial compared to dealing with the protégés of Slobodan Milosevic.

And there remains a strong possibility that the Radicals could yet hammer out a viable nationalist coalition government.

The only certainty in predicting the shape of Serbia’s next government is that nothing is certain.