14 May 2008: In Afghanistan battles are being waged on all fronts. For decades it has been a region in crisis, devoured by conflict and abused by those blind to Afghan resiliency and power of will. Not much else is know in Afghanistan but war. There have been continual cycles of invasion, bloodshed, drought, and extreme uncertainty. From the Soviets to the Taliban to the formidable presence of the U.S. military machine and NATO, the Afghani people have experienced little civil stability. And the battles rage on. Not only is Afghanistan the front line in the war on terror, it is also the front line in a global war on drugs.

The cultivation of poppy plants to be used for the purpose of making opium and other illicit drugs became a lucrative business in the late 1970’s. With the coming of the Soviets in 1979, local warlords, under the auspices of U.S. intelligence, used poppy revenues as means to purchase arms used to counter the invasion. In the years following the expulsion of Soviet forces the competing factions jockeying for power in Afghanistan relied ever more on the production of opium to fund their armies.

The infighting came to an end when in the mid-nineties the Taliban managed to consolidate control of the country’s administration. After years of reaping the financial benefits of the global opiate market, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar outlawed in 2001 the growing of poppy plants—many think it was to push the prices of the saturated market back up so Taliban stockpiles could be sold at a higher value.  

The U.S. led campaign to rid the region of terrorist safe-havens and extremist training camps culminated in the 2001 defeat of Taliban forces, which also effectively ended the ban on poppy cultivation. The people of Afghanistan, who had experienced a degree of stability under the brutally authoritarian Taliban regime, were left with little to cope with. The political instability devastated Afghanistan’s already faltering economy and the lack of resources forced many farmers back into the opium business, which to Afghani Muslims is a sign of desperation exceeding even that of eating pork to keep from starving. However, these farmers have been left with few alternatives and in many cases are intimidated into opium production by warlords and Taliban insurgents. It is estimated that between 20 and 40 percent of the Taliban’s revenues come from the sale of opium and other derivatives such as heroin.

Because this crop is contributing so much to the persistence of the Taliban threat and to the global drug market, the U.S. State Department and the White House have taken an aggressive stance regarding the eradication of poppy crops all together throughout the country. Afghanistan is currently producing 95 percent of the world’s opium and 80 percent of the world’s heroin. It has become so abundant that experts say this year Afghanistan will produce op to 40 percent more opium than the world demand.

The cultivation, trafficking, and consumption of opiates were all officially made illegal in 2002 under the, then, newly elected Karzai government. But these regulations are close to impossible to enforce for a government with little to no influence in the more remote areas of Afghanistan’s rugged wilderness. The government depends on warlords to maintain stability in these regions. Yet many of these warlords depend on opium to finance their own militias and use bribery and intimidation to avoid the destruction of their crops.

Helmand, a large southern Taliban controlled province produces more poppy than any other region in Afghanistan. In 2006 it produced 4,400 metric tons of opium, nearly half of the country’s total output according to UN statistics. Major Afghani eradication projects in the most productive regions including Helmand and Oruzgan have been met with violence and angry farmers. About 47,000 acres of poppy fields were cut down last year by federal and provincial eradication teams. This number is up from previous years, yet constitutes only 9 percent of Afghanistan’s total crop.

The State Department’s strategy is one of aggressive U.S. air and ground herbicide spraying missions meant to speed the process of eradication. However, the Karzai government is reluctant to endorse the spraying without a long-term plan of replacing a crop so vital to Afghanistan’s economy. Last year the opium trade brought Afghanistan $1.2 billion. The industry produces a livelihood for about 1.7 million people or 7 percent of Afghanistan’s rural population. Karzai’s argument—and that of the local farmers—is that they would like nothing more than to stop growing poppy but there are few alternatives. A swift eradication of these poppy fields, some of which lie alongside village food crops, will leave many with no means to live. Without a plan for viable alternatives the destruction of poppy crops will alienate the people and drive desperate farmers into the insurgency.

However, this problem cannot be solved simply by introducing a different cash crop. Wheat, for instance, has been suggested as a replacement. Yet, the ethical incentives for such a shift are negated by the fact that growers can earn $5,200 per acre of opium to the $121 they can earn from an acre of wheat. As the value of international food aid rises due to the current food crises wheat is becoming a more realistic alternative. However, the solution must go far beyond introducing a simple replacement. There needs to be a systemic change in the way agriculture is practiced and marketed.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has been active in Afghanistan since 2001 in attempts to revitalize the country’s once diverse agricultural sector. Citrus fruits, figs, dates, almonds, pistachios, and cotton once comprised 30 to 50 percent of Afghanistan’s export earnings. Today, due to drought and years of conflict and negligence many of these horticultural operations no longer exist, replaced by the war profiteering poppy crop. The FAO has been working to promote a holistic approach to rethinking local agricultural market schemes with NGOs and local institutions. Their projects range from the cultivation and marketing of commodities such as fruits, vegetables, milk, and poultry, to improving irrigation systems and strengthening public services and local infrastructure.

There are examples of high value alternatives that could possibly help wean Afghanis off their poppy dependence. Bashir Ahmad Ahmadi, head of agricultural administration in one of Afghanistan’s western provinces, has urged farmers in his region to grow saffron rather than poppy. Saffron, like many other spices grown in similar climates, is seen as a legitimate alternative. Spices like cumin and essential oils distilled from plants like lavender and rose essence used to make perfumes and soaps are all practical and profitable options. Such industries could provide employment in harvesting and cultivation and also in processing and packaging. The keys to the success of these crops as alternatives are improved law enforcement in regions typically dominated by the opium industry, and to put in place mechanisms that make it easier for farmers to get a fair price for their harvests.