6 May 2008: Lebanon recently postponed its presidential election for the 18th time, despite repeated and vocal demands—coming from abroad and at home—to hold an election. Arab disapproval of Syria’s involvement in perpetuating Lebanon’s political crisis was so severe that only 11 of 22 Arab heads of state attended the recent Arab League Summit in Damascus. Egypt and Saudi Arabia sent embarrassingly low-level officials; the latter’s Foreign Minister held a competing press event during which he reiterated widespread criticisms of Syria’s role in creating and sustaining the instability in Lebanon.

Lebanon’s constant internecine violence and failure to fill the presidential void have persisted even though the March 14 Alliance—the anti-Syrian coalition, which has a Parliamentary majority—could technically use its majority status to elect whoever it pleases. More surprising is that negotiations between the March 14 coalition and the Hezbollah-led opposition have not broken down for want of a consensus presidential candidate; both parties agree to the suitability of Lebanese Armed Forces General Michel Suleiman. Instead, their insoluble quarrel stems from how to govern after a new president is sworn in. Tensions revolve around two primary centers of gravity: Hezbollah’s disarmament, and Hezbollah’s insistence that it be granted veto power. The majority coalition will not legitimize Hezbollah’s arms, or heed their call for veto power.

The political vacuum was created when President Emile Lahoud’s term ended on November 23, 2007. In a normal democracy, the majority coalition would elect its candidate despite the minority dissent. But in Lebanon, the minority opposition has a powerful independent militia as well as foreign underwriting by Syria and Iran. To elect Gen. Suleiman requires an increased degree of cooperation from opposition parties because to elect a senior public official in less than two years since they held a public post requires a constitutional amendment. 

Tensions between Hezbollah and Israel boiled over in the summer of 2006, but after 34 days of destruction peace seemed preferable to the meandering and pernicious military contest. The Lebanese parliament—which included members of Hezbollah—approved UN Security Council Resolution 1701, a ceasefire resolution, which among other conditions stipulated the complete disarming of Hezbollah. But disarmament never occurred and violence continues at a simmer.  When Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyyah was killed in Syria in February of 2008, Hezbollah yet again turned up the heat—blaming the “Zionists” and extending their commitment to violence beyond Lebanon proper. Hezbollah steered away from any intimation of Syrian fault.

The renewed promise of violence occurs during a time when the majority coalition’s hold on power is odiously tenuous. The margin is so slim and the threat of political assassination so real that 40 MP’s are holed up in a downtown Beirut hotel, being careful not to part their curtains lest a Hezbollah or Syrian-backed sniper violently reshape the government’s ranks.

The longer the opposition prevents a president from being elected, the less credibly their population views them. But as far as Hezbollah is concerned, no president is best president; the lack of uncontested centralized leadership allows the opposition to continue its canonization of Lebanon. Despite the fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces have more heavy arms and are more numerous than their Hezbollah counterparts, Hezbollah’s Syrian and Iranian support allow them the luxury of ignoring domestic factors, which would otherwise scuttle a political party’s ship.

Hezbollah’s recent actions cast it increasingly as a deviant recalcitrant rather than a willing political participant. Indurate though they may be, the people of Lebanon are in no rush to re-live the visceral memories of the war Hezbollah brought two years ago. Nor are they comfortable with the continued levels of violence, especially when that violence is viewed as a new iteration of age-old Syrian meddling. When the Syrian army left in 2005, Hezbollah lost a powerful component of their control apparatus in Lebanon.

The recent progress being made between Syria and Israel in Turkey does not bode well for Hezbollah. Syria’s place as clandestine interlocutor within Lebanon would come under increased scrutiny if a relationship with Israel were to materialize. It is perhaps for this reason that president Assad has been hesitant to move from indirect to direct negotiations with Israel; to do so would mean moving Syria’s influence in Lebanon increasingly underground.

Hezbollah, and the opposition it heads, are at a decisive juncture. On the one hand, they seem content to function as a state within a state; demanding veto power in the cabinet of a government that they only possess 11% of the seats in and converting the city of Tyre into a rocket-launching base. But the 30-40% of the Lebanese population who share Hezbollah’s Shi’a identity has not translated into the political support Hezbollah expected.

When the Cedar Revolution protested the Syrian presence in Lebanon, they drew a crowd of one million. Hezbollah’s counter-protests produced only 200,000. Hezbollah’s call for open war and Israeli fears that Hezbollah may be ratcheting up its military training notwithstanding, Lebanese popular opinion is aligned against Hezbollah’s unilateral actions. One March 14 party leader remarked recently that “it is unacceptable and impossible for one party to decide to take the country to war on behalf of the entire Lebanese people.” 

If Hezbollah is—as some fear—going to repeat the events of the summer of 2006, they would do themselves a disservice in at least two ways: they would further isolate themselves from the domestic support they increasingly find themselves needing, and they would damage their own military capacity—one of the primary factors that makes them such a heavyweight in Lebanese politics. Add to the list that Hamas is considering a ceasefire with Israel, and it becomes apparent that though they might favor the status quo, the zeitgeist no longer favors Hezbollah.