4 April 2008: In less then a decade, once unstable and crisis generating States—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—are about to become the newest member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Albania and Croatia already received an invitation to join the military alliance (Macedonia will receive the invitation as soon as the name dispute with Greece is resolved), at NATO’s Bucharest Summit that started on April 2, 2008. For NATO this will be the sixth round of enlargement since the Alliance’s conception in 1949. 

As part of its policy to develop long-standing bilateral defense relationships with new democracies in Southeastern Europe, the U.S. has played a crucial role in helping Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia achieve defense reforms over the past decade, preparing them to become NATO members. All three are already members of the Adriatic Charter, a partnership the U.S. established in May 2003, to assist the three countries to work toward NATO membership.

What can NATO membership do for the Western Balkans? Obviously, apart from the willingness and commitment of the three countries to “further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic” (general condition for becoming a NATO member), the implications of the latest enlargement of the Alliance go far beyond.

Primarily, the effect will be that of further stabilizing the region of the Western Balkans. The region as a whole will take a grand step forward in leaving behind the tragic past of bloody wars and confrontations. This is because as an Alliance member, each country must engage in regional stability and promote peace and cross-borders cooperation.

A relatively positive example—relative because of the frozen conflict over Cyprus—of how important NATO enlargement is to regional stability is that of Greece and Turkey, which entered NATO in 1952. Despite always being at odds, membership in the alliance helped them ameliorate their relationship over the years, especially in the last two decades—a period in which the two countries achieved a substantial democratic consolidation.

In the case of Croatia, as a NATO member, the country will probably need to revise some of its present policies toward Bosnia. Often in the past, Croatia has urged Bosnia’s Croats to look to Zagreb rather then Sarajevo as their centre. Undoubtedly such behaviors were contradicting EU and NATO policies to further integrate the three communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats.

For Macedonia NATO integration is fundamental in strengthening state position and diplomacy efforts toward neighbors it shares antagonizing issues with, such as Greece—also a NATO member. Macedonia’s membership in the alliance will be possible only on the condition of solving the 17 contests about its name. Greece has opposed the name Macedonia claiming the country named itself after Greece’s northern province also called Macedonia. UN-sponsored negotiations that ended just days before the Summit were unsuccessful in finding a compromise. As a result Greece used its veto and Macedonia couldn’t receive an invitation at the Summit. NATO member did come to an agreement to issue the invitation for Macedonia as soon as the name dispute is resolved.

Albania and Croatia’s (eventually, also Macedonia’s) entrance in the alliance will have an immense effect in internal developments of these countries. The reformation process—political, economic, and military—which started in 2003 to fulfill the necessary conditions for NATO membership—has already been a catalyst in political stabilization of all three countries. As a result of this reform process, many steps were undertaken in intensifying internal political dialogue, reforming the judicial system, fighting crime and corruption, and reforming the military. This course of reforms is most likely to continue further in the future.

In Albania, NATO’s integration process brought about an unprecedented political cooperation between the reigning government and the opposition. Many needed reforms on the judicial, electoral law, armed forces, and anti-corruption activity have been made. The reforms were especially effective in the military sector. Throughout the years, the U.S. and other NATO members have helped destroy excess and dangerous small-caliber weapons, thousands of tons of equally obsolete and dangerous ammunition that was inherited from the communist regime’s relationship with Russia and China back in the 60s and 70s.

Croatia too has done many reforms in the course of NATO’s integration process. Most notably, it cooperated with the Hague Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia to prosecute those who committed war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia during the war.

In the context of internal stability and reforms, NATO membership is crucial especially for Macedonia. Since its independence in 1991, the country has known some political crises, generated by internal ethnic cleavages and confrontations that culminated with an armed conflict in 2001. But Macedonia’s goal to join the alliance brought Macedonians and Albanians—at odds with each other for a long time—to join efforts and work together in carrying out reforms and stabilizing the country.

After it failed to receive an invitation from NATO together with Albania and Croatia, Macedonia faces an uncertain political future. If no immediate solution is found about the name dispute, Greece may interrupt Macedonia’s progress toward EU as well.

Together with the EU integration process, which will come at a later stage, NATO integration is bringing together neighbors and former enemies and transforming their relationships in pursuit of common goals for institutional stability and democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Although neither one of the three countries is yet a model democracy—all are moving in that direction. Taking in consideration the old saying that “democracies don’t fight each other”, the prospects after NATO’s newest expansion seems to be brighter for the Balkans.

Apart from the benefactions, there is a price the countries will have to pay for their eventual NATO membership. As members, they will be expected to contribute to U.S. and NATO’s current and future military missions. Already, Albania and Macedonia have sent hundreds of soldiers abroad (Albania has a total of 280 troops serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Georgia; Macedonia has 237 soldiers in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia; Croatia has 200 troops stationed in Afghanistan) as part of both the U.S. and NATO led coalition.

Based on what late exit polls indicate in all three countries there is high public support for NATO integration, ranging from 90% in Albania and from 60-70 % in Croatia and Macedonia. Eager to join the powerful alliance, the price is considered to be worth paying.

However, NATO’s expansion in the Balkans and Eastern Europe is not welcomed by Russia and Serbia. Russia strongly opposes Ukraine and Georgia’s—two ex-USSR members—eventual membership in the alliance, considering it as a threat to its internal security. Due to Russia’s pressure and disagreements among European countries, NATO failed to invite Ukraine and Georgia to the Membership Action Plan (a NATO program of advice, assistance, and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance). But, the doors of the Alliance remain open for Ukraine and Georgia.

Serbia is likewise, unhappy about the alliance’s foothold in the neighborhood. With this latest enlargement, the country has found itself surrounded by NATO members and U.S. influence. Serbia has a history of discontent with NATO, stemming mainly from the NATO air campaign in 1999 against Belgrade in response to the Kosovo crisis.

Through new enlargement in the Western Balkans, NATO will continue to play a crucial role as an anchor of the reform and democratization process in South Eastern Europe.