24 March 2008: Pristina, Kosovo – A month after the declaration of independence by Kosovo’s Assembly in coordination with EU and U.S. officials, the new state is witnessing the first violent opposition within its newly-declared territory.

Emboldened by Russia, Serbia has been running a two-prong campaign to undermine Kosovo’s independence and state building by fighting it both in the international realm—by stopping recognition of the new state—and within Kosovo itself—by organizing local Kosovo Serbs, which make up to 5% of the overall population, to boycott Kosovar institutions and international military and civilian presence in Kosovo. The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), a mission which is supposed to gradually take over competencies from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO troops (under the command of KFOR—Kosovo Forces) have seen the biggest opposition.

Serbia seems to have gained terrain in both courses of these activities. Around 30 countries, including EU states, the United States, Japan, and Canada have already recognized the new state. Kosovo has amassed a good number of supporters internationally, but that will not be enough if in the near future the new state is denied UN membership because of a Russian veto. Kosovo still needs wider international recognition and acceptance in order to legitimize its declaration.

Nevertheless, the scenes of violence seen last Monday in northern Mitrovica are of particular concern. A region inhabited mainly by Kosovo Serbs, Mitrovica has raised fears about a possible division of the country.

Violence started last Monday, in an attempt by UNMIK’s police to regain control of the Mitrovica Court House, a local court building in northern Mitrovica, which was forcibly occupied by a mob of local Serbs on Friday, 14 March. As a result, around 41 UNMIK policemen were injured and one policeman from Ukraine has died. Some 70 Kosovo Serbs are reported to have been injured during the clashes. The damages are far-reaching; many UNMIK cars were burned during the unrest.

In a pres conference after the unrest, KFOR commander Xavier Bout de Marnhac and deputy UNMIK chief Larry Rossin reacted, saying that “a red line was crossed” when Molotov cocktails and bombs were thrown, and that “there was direct shooting at UNMIK and KFOR, with a clear intention to kill people”. Further, they said to have proof that some of Serbs who were inside the court building “have been identified as members of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior”, implicating Serbia’s direct involvement in the case. Serbia replied that outgoing governmental officials in Belgrade reacted against what they define as “excessive use of force” by UNMIK police and KFOR soldiers while dealing with the unrest. Kosovar institutions condemned the Serb unrest and called for cooperation with local and international institutions pledging for rule of law on the entire territory.

Last week’s Serb unrest in northern Kosovo represents a follow up of a series of measures taken by local Serbs, with Serbia’s direction, to boycott Kosovar institutions by strengthening Serbian control in the Serb localities in Kosovo and thus create preconditions for a tacit and gradual division of the country. This was evident immediately after the declaration of independence of Kosovo on February 17, when Serbia urged local Serbs to withdraw from the Kosovar Police Service and other institutions, and refuse to take orders from central institutions. These were followed by acts of violence in two border points with Serbia, where local Serbs burned Kosovo Customs’ facilities, turning the northern part of Kosovo into a grey zone and fertile ground for smuggling and trafficking. Likewise, Serbian Railways took control over railways in northern Kosovo and banned access from trains coming from the south.      

The UN Secretary-General Special Envoy’s Comprehensive Proposal—Ahtisaari Plan—for Kosovo guarantees high scale autonomy for Serb localities in Kosovo and foresees creation of new Serb-majority municipalities, including one in northern Mitrovica. According to this plan, Kosovo Serbs would govern themselves and take responsibility over many aspects of the political organization, such as education, taxes, the health system, spatial planning etc. The plan also allows Serb municipalities to establish close connection with the Serbian state and permits Serbia’s investments through a transparent process controlled by Kosovar central institutions.

Despite the fact that Serbia and Kosovo’s Serbs don’t accept Ahtisaari’s plan, Serbia has been continuously calling large scale decentralization and creation of new municipalities with clear Serb majority in Kosovo, refusing at the same time to undertake any steps toward cooperation with Kosovar central institutions. This selective approach is not new. Even in the case of UN Resolution 1244, Serbia would bind itself only to select aspects that were considered beneficiary. What’s clear is that without Serbia’s cooperation there can be no real integration of Serb localities in Kosovo’s political system.

These types of challenges and obstructions represent the main challenge that both Kosovo and the international bodies operating in Kosovo have to tackle first. The two are attempting to exercise power uniformly in the country and integrate Serb regions in the political system based on the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo.

Local media in Pristina report that international officials in Kosovo consider this unrest as Serbia’s “first serious attempt” to divide Kosovo. Since annulling the declaration of independence is not possible, Serbia is looking to prevent Kosovo from being a functional society by cementing a de facto division and creating a frozen conflict.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence is having a great impact inside Serbia itself. The declaration of independence has caused deep and controversial political division, as the coalition government between the Democratic Party (DS)—led by the more moderate present Serbian President, Boris Tadic, and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)—led by the nationalist outgoing Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, fell apart this month. The Serb Parliament was dissolved on March 13 and snap parliamentary elections will take place on May 11. The dilemma most of the Serb politicians are posing to their public is that of choosing between Kosovo and the EU.

More than any other time in past elections, Kosovo is the main topic of the debate during the electoral campaign in Serbia. Parties and leaders are arguing about who is more determined to fight for keeping Kosovo part of Serbia. And, in an attempt to gain more support of an electorate which is manifesting substantial anti-Western sentiments, both camps (radicals and more moderates) promise to enter the EU only with Kosovo as part of Serbia.

Many fear that if Radical Party of Serbia (SRS) manages to create a coalition with Kostunica’s party—early polls indicate that this is very likely to happen—Serbia risks isolation, since Kostunica and Nikolic (current leader of SRS) promised to refuse any cooperation with the EU without first annulling Kosovo’s independence. In this context, a pro-radical vote in Serbia’s election in May, might isolate Serbia and bring about negative implications for Kosovo.

In a situation when Kosovar institutions lack necessary capacities and competencies to deal with violence coming from within or without—Kosovo doesn’t have an army yet—unity and territorial integrity of the country depends on the presence of international civilian and military on the ground.

One thing is clear: though Kosovo has been recognized by 30 countries, without membership in international institutions and mechanisms—such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU, and NATO—and without a fully established control in its own territory, the new state’s independence remains fragile.

Kosovo, at least for now, is far from being the sovereign and independent state that was declared on February 17, 2007. It will be up to the international community and Kosovo’s own institutions to make that happen swiftly and with as little violence as possible. Serbia’s May 11 elections are of equal importance in this equation. Whether Serbia will choose to continue its path toward future EU integration or linger with its past differences with Kosovo remains to be seen.