Perhaps the greatest lesson that the September 11, 2001 attacks taught American policymakers is the impracticality of isolation in a world whose borders are gradually diminishing to the point where even the smallest of countries have the potential to create a significant disruption in the broader global system. The greatest defense against our present enemies is unity, both within our government and beyond. For the Bush Administration, multilateralism cultivated through a mixture of foreign aid and principled guidance has become the last refuge for a nation besieged by the ever-looming terrorist threat.

Iraq and Afghanistan

With the twin challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan draining the government of vital economic resources and staining America’s reputation abroad, the need to rebuild shattered nations has become an offshoot issue of the new multilateralist cause. To that end, the need to balance both hard power and soft power has arisen, particularly in Afghan and Iraqi areas that face a shortage of aid workers and diplomatic personnel. In the absence of civilian workers, the military has taken over many of the crucial state building duties traditionally looked after by the State Department and the NGO community. To some extent, this is a positive development, as the Departments of Defense and State may gain some mutual understanding that could ease the long-standing rivalries they have had over leadership styles and jurisdiction.

At the same time, it reflects a most unfortunate reality: the diplomatic corps and aid missions to Iraq and Afghanistan are far too small. According to one Foreign Service Officer, the level of appointments to those two countries remains minimal since many officers are too afraid to serve there. “The State Department doesn’t like to look like it’s compelling anyone to serve,” he added. Consequently, Secretary Rice has expressed a desire to add 1100 diplomats and 300 workers to USAID. In like manner, Senators Lugar and Biden have requested more federal funding to bolster civilian capabilities and create a reserve corps of citizens to work for the State Department in difficult areas.

However, no amount of money in the world can compensate for the fear created by a relentless insurgency that, despite best efforts by the U.S. and its allies, seems to run amok in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lack of a well-dispersed international coalition has contributed to the violent instability in certain isolated regions of these two nations that scares off otherwise competent and valuable diplomatic personnel. For instance, the counter-insurgency in the unstable southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan is handled mainly by the U.S. and her allies, Britain and the Netherlands. Meanwhile, other coalition participants like Italy have forces concentrated in the more peaceful northern and western areas where no fighting is taking place. To counter this uneven distribution, Undersecretary Burns is planning on asking NATO at its next conference to rotate international forces in Afghanistan to ensure more military presence in the contested sections and strike a more even balance between stabilization efforts and actual combat engagement. Complete restoration of Afghan and Iraqi society can only come by way of a consistent team effort.

Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, multilateralism through diplomatic persuasion and economic aid has come to be appreciated as an influential force in regional stability. Since September 11, our strategic priorities have shifted from Europe to the Middle East and South Asia, with the former playing a supporting role in policies earmarked for the latter. The carrot-and-stick policy that the United States favors with relation to Iran and in partnership with Europe is a testament to this new diplomatic framework.

Iran and the Nuclear Issue

On March 3, 2008, the UN Security Council adopted a third resolution imposing sanctions on Iran for refusing to cease its uranium enrichment program. Among other things, the resolution “authorizes inspections of cargo to and from Iran suspected of carrying prohibited equipment, tightens monitoring of Iranian financial institutions and extends travel bans and asset freezes against [individuals] and companies involved in the [Iranian] nuclear program.” Thus far, the U.S. has chosen to remain on the punitive side, favoring an all-sticks approach in its fervent support for the resolutions.

On the other hand, Europe has chosen to complement disciplinary measures with incentives designed to entice Iran into abandoning its program for good. According to a February 26, 2008 New York Times article by Helene Cooper and Warren Hodge, the European incentive package, due for completion in May at the earliest, may include “joint ventures between European and Iranian oil companies and talks on regional security issues.” These incentives should make the prospect of pressuring Iran on its uranium enrichment plans a little more agreeable for Russia and China, whose commercial ties with the Shi’ite theocracy have influenced their reluctance to support little more than a “watered-down set of sanctions.”

Ideally, these arrangements are tailor-made to American interests. Undersecretary Burns has admitted that “there is plenty of space [in the American foreign policy agenda] for diplomacy with Iran.” The desired scenario is that while the U.S. simultaneously pushes for sanctions and reaffirms its commitment to speak with Iran once the latter is ready to cooperate, European allies and countries like Russia, China, and Japan that have trade relations with the theocracy downplay their economic relations to send a clear message that Iranian recalcitrance on the nuclear issue will not be tolerated. The downside to this framework is that America misses the opportunity to undermine Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government from within by establishing relations with its more moderate elements.

Contrary to popular belief, the Iranian administration is not a straight-up monolithic tyrannical force; instead it possesses a plurality of viewpoints that differ dramatically from Ahmadinejad’s fanatical rhetoric. On March 16, 2008, more than 30 reformist politicians gained seats in the Iranian parliamentary elections despite being banned from running by conservative elements in the government. Although the conservatives took the majority of offices, the new Parliament is expected to challenge Ahmadinejad’s heavily oil-reliant economic policies, which are blamed for the country’s nearly 18 percent inflation rate. Amongst the newly elected conservatives are moderates like Ali Larijani, the former nuclear negotiator who resigned over his political differences with Ahamdinejad. With Iranian presidential elections scheduled for 2009, it is likely that the Ahmadinejad administration will face serious challenges to its authority and a possible takedown. The Bush Administration would do well to cultivate relations with some of the new Iranian moderates to ensure an end to Ahmadinejad’s rule, as well as a more positive American-Iranian relationship that could generate a beneficial compromise for all on the nuclear issue.

India-Pakistan

On the other end of the spectrum, American policy in Pakistan does not require more diplomatic engagement in multilateral measures but rather a refocusing of foreign policy priorities and economic aid. Currently, the counter-terrorist campaign against the pockets of Al Qaeda and Taliban units that persist in Pakistan’s tribal areas is at a stalemate due to a disagreement over whether to develop a counterinsurgency against militants or “shore up” a conventional force to address potential threats from India.

Even though tensions between India and Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir region have lessened in recent years, officials in the State Department and the Pentagon say that Pakistan is not ready to “reduce its traditional commitment” towards fighting a land war with India. This discrepancy in priorities is illustrated by the tactical disconnect between the American and Pakistani military forces, as the latter has requested an “armored air defense radar” even though Al Qaeda and the Taliban do not have air force capabilities. To make matters worse, the Bush Administration is worried that $5 billion that the U.S. has reimbursed Pakistan since 2001 for “conducting military operations to fight terrorism” has been “diverted to finance weapons systems suited to fight India,” not terrorist guerillas. In the meantime, refugee camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border impervious to police and security access have become breeding grounds for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. To compensate for a faltering campaign, Congress is mulling over a proposed $5 million five-year plan of economic aid to Pakistan to create jobs and economic opportunities in isolated regions traditionally subject to the machinations of terrorists who use area development and charitable initiatives as fronts for terrorist recruiting and training.

It is good to funnel aid to areas that are prime targets for “benevolent” terrorist incursion. However, more must be done to repair the broken Indo-Pakistani relationship. As long as a constant fear of imagined threats from India persists, Pakistan will continually concentrate on bolstering itself for a conventional war while allowing more creative enemies to overrun its more isolated sectors.

Since winning the elections on February 18, 2008, the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) have constantly called for President Pervez Musharraf’s resignation and even gone so far as blaming him for suicide bombings, such as the attack on a restaurant frequented by foreign citizens in Islamabad on March 15, 2008. For any kind of progress to occur, a coalition that comes as close to unity as possible on key issues in the anti-terrorist campaign must be established. Recriminations and political rivalry are obstacles to that ideal.

Consequently, the Bush Administration ought to step up its efforts in Pakistan to achieve some kind of working compromise between the parties, as well as between Pakistan and India. Whatever his failings on a human rights level may be, Musharraf is still a vital player in a political system that has historically been influenced by the military and as a general he would be the most appropriate choice to renegotiate Pakistani military objectives.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Pakistan is not the only place in which fear obstructs multilateral efforts at curbing terrorism. The recent Israeli Defense Force (IDF) offensive in Gaza that killed 120 civilians and the massacre of eight students at the Merkaz Harav religious college in Jerusalem has put a wrench in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Deeply angered over the IDF bombings, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas suspended the peace talks, only to be pressured into resuming them by Rice.

For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has been given no realistic incentive to evacuate illegal outposts and halt settlement activity in the West Bank. In Israeli eyes, Jewish settlements are the most effective buffers between them and hostile elements. The Jerusalem school massacre, which was later claimed by Hamas, and the atmosphere of terror that it has generated between Jewish and Arab citizens in that divided city only serves to confirm what the Israeli government believes about the centrality of settlement activity in its anti-terror policy.

Prior to the Gaza offensive and the school attack, there had been no substantial progress on commitments made during the November Annapolis summit. The origins of this inactivity may be the discrepancy between Israeli and Palestinian objectives in the peace process. For example, Abbas wants to reach an agreement immediately enabling Palestinian statehood but Olmert only wants that agreement to come after the Palestinian government has reined in occupied territory militants “as per the 2003 road map peace plan.” Displeased with this stalemate, Secretary Rice is planning a visit to Israel in 10 days to pressure Israel and the Palestinian Authority to honor their commitments before President Bush’s upcoming May visit.

Oddly enough, multilateralism does not seem to have been explored adequately in this particular issue. The conflict requires far more time to mediate and it cannot simply be bundled within an abstract campaign of “things to do in the Middle East.” If Bush and Rice wish to foster a definitive peace agreement before the former leaves office, then it may be in their best interest to encourage the participation of European allies like Norway who has past experience in the peace process and others who can be seen more or less as neutral forces. On account of their large Muslim population and their anti-terror policies, France and Britain, respectively, should not be considered. The talents of previously untapped administrations in Sweden, Denmark and others who can be seen as having no baggage in the region should be explored.

Towards Multilateralism

As long as the war on terror continues to dominate foreign policy, the Middle East and South Asia will continue to be the dominant lynchpins in America’s multilateral diplomacy. Europe, by and large, is seen more as a complement to these efforts rather than an objective, although issues like Kosovo, European energy issues, and carbon emissions continue to be matters of importance.

The same multilateral campaign that aided Kosovo in its bid for independence may be needed to calm a Serbia in turmoil given the resignation in protest of its Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and the need for new Serbian elections in May.

Other regions like Latin America and Africa could benefit from more multilateral intervention, particularly when it comes to foreign aid. While it is admirable that the U.S. has contributed so much in terms of military and economic resources to these areas, once again it is important to remember that it is simply not practical for us to handle it all alone. Europe must form a greater presence in these regions, so that our resources are not drained for their sustenance.

Multilateralism has become a greater focus within the Bush Administration’s foreign policy insofar as it relates to anti-terrorism and the independence of favored breakaway republics. But, as shown by Israel and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, more involvement by our allies in certain regions ought to be encouraged. Like the perennial student, we must learn our lessons from past initiatives and remember to let others help us.