29 February 28, 2008: The recent elections in Pakistan on February 18 have once again refocused world attention on the future of the country’s democratic transition from military rule. Although officially undeclared, it appears evident that the opposition parties have won a significant victory and a coalition government has tentatively been agreed upon, drastically altering the balance of political power away from current president and long time ruler Pervez Musharraf.

Having retired from his official role in the military, the victory of the opposition and clear defeat of the PML-Q pro-Musharraf party will likely leave the president isolated and potentially without a long term future in the political life of Pakistan. This prospect raises questions about the future of domestic politics in Pakistan, long characterized by Musharraf’s dominant presence, and the future of U.S. foreign policy in the region, which has long supported him.

According to election results reported by the BBC, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), formerly led by Benazir Bhutto, has won the largest share with 87 seats in Parliament.  The next largest opposition parties, namely the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif and the ANP have gained 66 and 10 seats respectively. It appears that a ruling coalition will be composed of these three parties and could potentially hold two-thirds of Parliament, which is sufficient for impeachment proceedings against the president. It is also the necessary majority for initiating changes to the country’s constitution that could transfer power from the presidency to the role of the prime minister. 

Buoyed by their victory, party leaders have already announced their desire to return power to the Parliament and restore a functioning democracy in Pakistan. First on the list of the reforms, however, appears to be the restoration of an independent judiciary, which has been the site of several power struggles with Musharraf. 

Early statements by Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N suggest that he will not accept any government with supporters of Musharraf and will be pushing for Musharraf’s departure from the presidency, even if it requires impeachment proceedings. The PML-N has never recognized the legitimacy of the presidency. Asi Ali Zardari, co-chairman of the PPP, has been more moderate and will likely lead the PPP to attempt changes that transform the president into a de facto figurehead with little practical power.

Both parties have expressed their desire to tackle the problems in the Pakistani economy, specifically inflation and unemployment which are at the top of public concerns. In either scenario Musharraf’s position as president is rapidly becoming untenable. He faces the likelihood of being forced to depart through political pressure from the opposition or the threat of actual impeachment, which may become a reality if the coalition is able to obtain a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

The election also raises important questions about the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan and its influence over the course of domestic political affairs in the country.

Over the past year, the Bush administration has continued to support Musharraf as a key ally in the region and the war on terror while seeking to achieve democratic reform and create ties with opposition leaders in Pakistan, especially given his looming political decline. The Wall Street Journal has suggested that after the election the U.S. will continue to change its approach from “a ‘Musharraf’ policy to a broader Pakistani one.” 

But other sources suggest that the outcome of February 18 may pose a much more significant shock to U.S. plans than may appear at first glance. The Washington Post reported that U.S. intelligence officials were predicting the results would blend opposition parties with existing Musharraf allies, leaving him still reigning over the winning coalition government. These events did not come to pass and it is questionable whether the U.S. is prepared to lose its longest and deepest source of influence in Pakistan.

Another indicator of the American reaction may be discerned from comments of Senators Joe Biden and Chuck Hagel—who have returned from a recent visit to the country—suggesting a policy of economic aid and non-military support as a reward for Pakistan’s return to democratic government. 

However, it is difficult to predict where the new government will land when it comes to supporting the U.S. war on terror or dealing with the Taliban infiltration of tribal areas south of the Afghani border. Although official results are expected to be announced on March 1, a dispute is already in the makings. Some party leaders have indicated that Parliament may elect to negotiate directly with tribal leaders, sidelining the military.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates has already fired his warning on the prospect of such talks, stating that “Even the Musharraf government tried talking and doing deals in Waziristan. That didn’t work out very well.”

There are two discernible results that will prove to be lasting factors in Pakistan’s political landscape: the defeat of the PML-Q which served as a final referendum on Musharraf’s performance and the abysmal performance of the religious parties with the Muslim Alliance earning only six seats in Parliament. 

In the long term, the victory of secular democratic parties over the more fundamentalist ones may prove to be of far greater significance than the victory of the opposition over Musharraf’s supporters. 

What remains to be seen is whether this coalition has a future after Musharraf, who serves as the focal point for the opposition and the linchpin for the PPP and PML-N, two parties whose historical relationship has been of animosity and rivalry, not cooperation.  Their campaigns had been characterized more with slogans than with practical agendas for the country’s political and economic problems.

Although there are high expectations, the current agreement has the potential of turning into the gridlock and bitter politics that have often described previous experiences with democracy in Pakistan. This makes the isolation of Musharraf a proposition with risk for both domestic and international stakeholders alike.