On June 11, 2007 the FARC announced the death of 11 political hostages in their possession, the result of an attack from a rival military group. Colombian citizens protested in the streets before demanding an answer to this question: when will the fighting in Colombia stop?

The failed negotiations with the FARC in 2002 set the agenda for the Uribe government. Uribe took a hard line against the guerrilla groups, which did quell the violence, but has not brought about any peaceful negotiation for disarmament since. There are also continuing allegations of links to paramilitaries and members of Uribe’s administration, damaging his public image in the international community. An agreement with the United States, “Plan Colombia,” was designed to eradicate the coca plantations. But the plan was not successful and failed to address the humanitarian issues facing Colombia today.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Colombia is second to the Sudan in terms of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) with somewhere between 1.8 to 3.8 million people. The actors at the grassroots level are trying to tackle the humanitarian issues that have risen as a result of the fighting. Their goal is to work with farmers in finding alternate sources of employment and searching for ways to reconcile the abuses that Colombians have suffered emotionally, financially, and physically.

Negotiating with the Enemy

Uribe entered the Presidency in 2002, at a time when peace negotiations between the Colombian government under former President Andres Pastrana and the FARC were collapsing. The negotiations between the government and the FARC began formally in 1999 in the section of San Vicente del Caguan. They began as a result of a promise Pastrana made during his presidential campaign. He promised the electorate that he would go to the jungle to meet Manuel Marulanda, leader of the FARC to negotiate an end to the war, if he was elected.

One of the conditions requested by the FARC was that Pastrana had to assure them a demilitarized zone that would provide the guerrillas with the security they needed. The demilitarized zone was granted to them in order to get the leaders of the guerrilla group to the table. Despite these concessions, the FARC’s participation in the negotiations was inconsistent. They did not attend some of the high profile meetings, and when they did attend, they came with high demands that they wanted met before they consented to anything.

There were various obstacles in Caguan that made the peace negotiations difficult. The first was the demilitarization of the guerrilla groups. The government never knew whether to trust the FARC or not when it claimed that it was ready to give up its arms. The claims of a cease-fire rang hollow when months later the guerrillas started their kidnappings, bombs, or other attacks again. The second obstacle dealt with the release of prisoners on both sides. The FARC has under its possession three American defense contractors and the French-Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt—not to mention the over 3,000 hostages that are not being part of this high-level negotiations. In exchange for their release, FARC wants rebels held in Colombian prisons to be released. How the government and the FARC will exchange hostages remains a matter of contention.

The 3,000 hostages are mostly made up of politicians, paramilitaries, and police and the only voice they have in the negotiations is the voice of someone else who is fighting on their behalf. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, is fighting for the release of Ingrid Betancourt, but most hostages do not have such high profile representatives. Their hope for release depends on how hard intermediary groups will push the Colombian government and the FARC together to negotiate a deal.   

Uribe’s Approach

When Uribe entered the scene, his campaign attacked the Pastrana government for continuing the negotiations when it was becoming apparent that the FARC had no intention of giving up arms. During the negotiations, the FARC was continuing its operations outside the military zone, and the guerrillas that were inside the zone were being retrained and planning new operations. The negotiations finally collapsed in February 2002, precisely when Uribe was elected the new President of Colombia.

Uribe’s past experience with the FARC has not been a positive one. His father was killed by rebel groups at their family home in Antioquia in 1983. “I hold no bitterness,” he said before being elected president for the first time. “I just want to serve Colombia,” he told BBC News. There have also been assassination attempts on his life. He was not going to allow them to overshadow the government of Colombia.

Uribe took a different approach with the FARC. Since the failure of the Caguan negotiations, the Uribe administration has been hesitant to negotiate with the FARC. Uribe does not want to commit the same errors Pastrana made with the demilitarized zone. However, the hostage situation resulted in over one million Colombians taking the streets on July 5, 2007 to protest the handling of the situation. This alone can force Uribe to take the steps necessary to achieve lasting peace.

Another issue that could squash any hope of negotiations is the latest scandals that have surfaced about the Uribe administration. The links of his Administration to paramilitary groups have threatened his credibility both in his own country and abroad. The accused officials are members of his administration and at least eight members of his coalition in Congress. According to The New York Times, Jorge Norguera, former chief of Colombia’s secret police, was arrested for using information obtained from the executive branch’s intelligence service to assassinate union organizers and university professors. The public statements and the trials themselves which are being investigated by the Supreme Court in Colombia could distract the Colombian president from pursuing negotiations with the FARC.

International Involvement

The European governments have offered to help Colombia with the negotiation process. After the recent killing of 11 hostages, Spain, France, and Switzerland tried to intervene by asking Colombia if the later would allow a Geneva-based commission to investigate the deaths. Uribe rejected their offer. These three countries have tried before to be intermediaries in December 2005. The talks collapsed because FARC would not cooperate.

The United States has also offered its services to help Colombia. The United States and the “Plan Colombia” is one example, a controversial plan signed in 1999 by former Colombian President Andres Pastrana and U.S. President Bill Clinton. Colombia receives over $700 million dollars in foreign assistance putting it in the same category as Israel and the Middle East. The amount of money that Colombia receives for counter narcotics and terrorism is disproportionate to the amount that they receive for humanitarian efforts..

Although the war in Colombia is an internal conflict, it has always been framed in terms of the foreign policy agenda espoused by Washington. For instance, Andres Pastrana termed his agenda “Diplomacy for Peace” as a way to entice the Clinton Administration to come to Colombia and help him prevent the breakdown of democracy in his country. Later, when Alvaro Uribe came into power, he termed his agenda “Democratic Security,” spinning it to fit with Bush’s war on terrorism. Bush responded by including the FARC on the White House’s list of terrorist organizations, and the President received authorization from Congress to secure the $500 million that the United States was contributing annually through “Plan Colombia.” Keeping Washington their closest ally has helped Colombia secure political, financial, and military support in the fight against the guerrillas.

But recently the relationship between the United States and Colombia has turned sour. A Democratic Congress has reversed the course of action taken by both the Clinton and Bush administrations as a result of the insufficient progress in the reduction of the drug trade. They are also concerned about the Uribe administration, especially after scandals involving members in his administration. The relationship that Colombia has with the United States could be affected by the change in the executive branch. If the new incumbent sides with the Congress, then it could signal a shift in U.S.-Colombian relations. What is keeping it afloat now is the tight relationship between Bush and Uribe.

Colombia’s oil-producing neighbor, Venezuela, has also offered its services. Although these two countries share a border, the ideological leaning of these two leaders could not be any more different. Uribe is conservative and pro-American while Hugo Chavez is extremely liberal and well known for being anti-American. Piedad Cordoba, a Colombian senator, asked Uribe to consider the possibility of having Chavez come to Colombia to talk with leader of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda Velez. While Uribe has rejected the idea of establishing a demilitarized zone in San Vicente de Caguan for the talks between Chavez and the FACR; he has agreed to let the negotiations take place in Venezuela.

The Peace Research Center, based in Madrid, Spain sees the bilateral relationship Colombia has with the United States as a huge risk. It believes that Colombia pushes Europe into the background and, by not diversifying its foreign relations, places itself at the mercy of Washington. As mentioned earlier, the Democrat-controlled Congress has not been pleased with “Plan Colombia” and has threatened to cut funding.

Where to Go From Here?

There seem to be many people interested in negotiating a peaceful settlement to the Colombian conflict--Europe, the Colombian citizens, the United States, and even Venezuela. However, the person that seems most hesitant to conduct any type of peace talks has been Uribe. Alfredo Rangel Suarez, president of Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia said this during a forum held at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in December 2006. He called what the government is suffering from is the “Caguan syndrome.” The fear of the demilitarized zone is reason for the lack of progress in negotiations even though demilitarization was a tactic used by the government to bring the FARC to the negotiating table. He further says that “the escalation of armed hostilities targets the government’s Achilles’ heel—security.” Uribe needs to consider other options that might be more successful. 

There has to be a sense of urgency on Uribe’s part because time is soon running out for him. The end of his term is only two years away, and if nothing happens, the war will just continue like it has for the past forty years. Although he has made some progress in terms of strengthening the economy and reducing the levels of violence, it just does not seem to be enough. Those successes are just band-aids. They are not enough to heal the deep wounds that have divided this South American country for so long.

The latest offers from Hugo Chavez pose two potential risks for Uribe. First, there is the chance that by allowing Chavez to act as an intermediary Uribe could jeopardize the relationship he has with the United States. The Bush Administration could turn against the Colombian government, and possibly threaten to pull financial support. Also, if Uribe allows Chavez to enter into negotiations with the FARC, it would create the need for a demilitarized zone which is something that the Colombian president is hesitant to initiate. Instead, Chavez has offered to bring the talks to the Venezuelan capital of Caracas. Security still is an issue that needs to be worked out. Finally, are Chavez’s intentions true? He might be using Colombia as a way to antagonize the United States and to gain support in the region.

Europe helped support the peace negotiations in the past and appears willing to do so again. The European Union hosted international meetings in Madrid in July 2000, in Bogotá in October 2000, and in Brussels in April 2001. After the failed negotiations, Europe took a more active role in assisting local initiatives instead. Now, with the recent momentum towards conducting peace talks, Europe could help secure the proper conditions for negotiations to take place.

Although Chavez has given negotiations new life, Europe should be included in the process as well. France would like to see the release of Ingrid Betancourt, and for this reason, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has let it be known that he is ready to go to Colombia to help the peace process along if necessary. He is also willing to work with Chavez to encourage and support the negotiations with the FARC. It would be beneficial for Colombia to have France on board as well because they have past experience working in Colombia, and they have a vested interest in seeing an end to the conflict.