30 November, 2007: Washington, DC -- Yesterday Musharraf was sworn into office as the country’s new civilian President, ending his military career and promising to repeal emergency rule on December 16. The past month has been one of deep controversy over the suspension of civil liberties since emergency rule was imposed on November 3, increasing domestic opposition to Musharraf from different elements of civil society and political parties, along with mounting pressure from the U.S. for his resignation as commander of the military. General Kayani, the former head of Pakistan’s intelligence services now stands to take over leadership of the army, which has been the most dominant institution in society throughout Musharraf’s rule. In his first speech as a civilian leader Musharraf claimed the U.S. was pressuring a form of democracy unsuitable to Pakistani society, reflecting his intention to maintain influence over the political course of the country, and the desire to shape the “democratic transition” as he envisions it.

Opposition groups have met this latest move with guarded approval, having long criticized his military rule and what they claim is a clear lack of commitment to the restoration of democracy.  Musharraf’s resignation as commander grants him the appearance of being responsive to popular demands, returning the country to a democratic path, with general elections scheduled for January 8.

But it is a political gamble.

Abolishing emergency rule and ending his formal control of the military will, no doubt, ease international pressure, but may entail sacrificing leverage over the only institution that serves as the powerbase and guarantor of his continued rule. It is doubtful that any serious loss of power will be visible in the immediate future, however. Years of influence and the appointment of supporters to key posts within the army will not dissipate overnight. 

The recent political flashpoint resulted from Musharraf’s highly controversial election as President and subsequent legal challenges heard by the Supreme Court, a highly respected institution and one that has served as a check on his power. While claiming a sharp rise in “threats to the nation” Musharraf used the imposition of emergency rule to sack judges on the court that allowed challenges to his presidency. He has detained thousands of members of civil society, arrested political opponents and cracked down on the media. A sign of his declining hold over the nation, the resort to this policy stems from a long running battle with the Supreme Court and domestic interest groups ranging from lawyers to religious conservatives. Legal group opposition has focused around Iftikhar Chaundhry, the former chief justice, who was sacked in March for ruling against the government, leading to protests by judges and lawyers. Detentions and the sacking of other independent judges have led to further public resentment and a desire to see him out of political life. But he has succeeded in his objective, removing roadblocks to assuming the presidency, at considerable cost to the democratic process or the semblance of an independent judiciary.

Pakistan continues to face challenges from militants and religious extremists engaged in a battle with the military in the border tribal areas with Afghanistan and in the capital itself. During Musharraf’s rule militancy has increased, along with suicide bombings and the influence of religious conservatives in Pakistani society at the expense of political moderates and civil society elements. The country remains unstable with a spike in militant activity after the army’s assault on the Red Mosque, a cornerstone of radicalism, which resulted in over 100 casualties. That action marked a departure point leading to a surge of suicide bombings and attacks. While the army’s efforts to deal with the militant problem have increased, stability in Pakistan’s security situation has not, with questionable prospects for the future given Musharraf’s weakening legitimacy and the absence of suitable alternatives to his leadership.

Political opposition remains divided--though unified in its current refusal to accept the legitimacy of the new president. A power sharing arrangement appeared in the making earlier this fall when Benazir Bhutto returned from self-imposed exile in October, as the head of the Pakistan People’s Party, and held negotiations with Musharraf’s advisers. But this deal seems to have collapsed and Bhutto herself has been placed twice under house arrest in the past two months. Nawaz Sharif, who was deposed by the 1999 coup, has also recently returned as the leader of a more conservative party and no doubt intended as a balance against Bhutto to prevent the PPP from garnering too many votes in the upcoming election. 

Bhutto has sought to obtain personal amnesty for longstanding corruption charges and the lift of a two-term limit on the Prime Ministerial post, which both she and Sharif have already exhausted according to current law. She continues to oppose the suspension of the constitution, and refuses to serve as PM under a Musharraf presidency, but it remains to be seen whether Bhutto, proven to be politically savvy and opportunistic, will stick to this policy or attempt a new power sharing deal of her own. Both parties have not taken an official position on the upcoming election and continue talks of a boycott, it remains to be seen whether they will unify, especially given that religious conservatives are looming as a third political force in Pakistani society. In their current fractured state the political opposition has served more to check itself than Musharraf’s continued grip on power.

U.S. influence continues to play an important, thought often overstated role.  Seeing Musharraf’s decline, the U.S. attempted to hedge its bets by pushing for more democratic reforms and the return of exiled political leaders.  Frustration has grown with his inability to deal with pro-Taliban militants, and the absence of anyone else that can effectively hold an unstable country together. Weak and diminished, Musharraf will still retain considerable presence and power as a civilian president, while his new role will make it easier for the U.S. to continue its support.

The U.S. has recognized that its ties with Pakistan have been personalized by its relationship with Musharraf, and has attempted to connect with leaders from the opposition by forcing the acceptance of their return. This policy has backfired. Musharraf, appearing to cave under American pressure, has actually benefited with the ability to maintain close watch over political opponents, restrict their capacity to pose a serious challenge and pit one against the other, thus maintaining presence as the only sound choice for continued U.S. support. 

Furthermore, if one of the opposition leaders assumes the post of Prime Minister it will not only serve to create him an image as power-sharing President, but also give the opposition leadership a chance to fail--a distinct prospect given Pakistan’s current challenges and the existing division in the political sphere.

Thus American efforts to create long term ties with Pakistan, and place a deeper anchor, have resulted in a political show and the continuation of Musharraf as the only real connection between the two countries, leaving the policy trapped to what appears to be a sinking ship. 

It is evident that Musharraf has outplayed the U.S., but one cannot blame its efforts since the current situation has left few favorable policy options, none of which have clear prospects for success. As Pakistan’s military continues a split effort to battle militants, with some intelligence circles maintaining support for pro-Taliban extremists, America faces the inevitability of Musharraf’s downfall and with it the potential collapse of its Pakistan policy. 

Prospects for a positive transition still exist if the U.S. employs its influence to pressure the reestablishment of an independent judiciary, focuses on its ties with the military institution, and works to bolster the core elements of Pakistan’s civil society rather than the fractured political opposition groups whose leaders failed to govern properly years ago and will doubtfully do so in a future with or without Musharraf.