By Ryan Harding, Contributor
Recently John Bellinger, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, submitted an op-ed piece to The New York Times, titled “More Continuity Than Change,” critical of the Obama Administration’s demonstrative lack of commitment to both upholding international law and separating itself from the policies of the Bush Administration, which used claims of national sovereignty to circumvent international law.
Although Bellinger’s article covers considerable ground—touching on the Justice Department’s recent decision to permanently suspend (or deny) 50 Guantanamo detainees habeas corpus rights as well as the Administration’s decision to continue to use the highly criticized and controversial tool of rendition—one topic of considerable import is the Obama Administration’s continued resistance to signing the Rome Statute and joining the International Criminal Court.
Although the Administration’s rhetoric seems to point to the idea that Mr. Obama has, since his inauguration, sought to usher in a new age of international co-operation, its actions, as Bellinger indicates, have helped to reinforce the image of America as an uncooperative international power inclined to making unilateral decisions without regard for the mechanisms, processes, and content of international law. What has yet to be questioned, however, is not the legitimacy of America’s decision making during this Age of Terror (such is called into question daily), but whether this image of America as a Rogue State (so-to-speak) is the product of outdated assumptions about the anatomy of global and domestic security threats.
While it is accepted that the events of 9/11 prompted a shift in America’s national security strategy (i.e. was a game-changer with respect to how, and the intensity with which, America approached and dealt with national security threats emanating—by and large—from the Middle East) it could be argued that 9/11 signaled a true paradigm shift, changing policy makers’ perception about the nature of national and international security.
Much in the same way that Einstein’s revelations about the composition of space and time completely redefined our view of the material universe (making completely incoherent, for example, Newton’s conclusions—and therefore, all previous assumptions—about the nature of gravity), one could argue that 9/11 helped to undermine many key assumptions about the nature of national security threats, and in turn, drastically altered the calculus policy makers’ use when responding to threats to America’s material and immaterial interests.
Arguing that despite this fundamental change, the assumptions—about the nature of domestic threats, and what constitutes an appropriate response to such—that underlie many of the criticisms lodged at the Bush Administration, and now the Obama Administration, predate this shift.
What must be acknowledged is that transnational terrorism has affected not only America’s attitude towards international cooperation and its compliance with international law but has forced individual Americans to unknowingly re-imagine the limits of their liberty.
Without a doubt, transnational terrorism has had a profound and lasting effect on the way policy makers do business. As policy makers look to prevent terrorist plots from being realized, terrorism will continue to be a source of tension between national security interests and claims of individual liberty. In addition, the issue of terrorism has, and will continue to challenge the existing body of international law. And it is quite possible, as the Bush, and now the Obama Administration believes, that some enemy combatants, because of the danger they present to civil society, should not stand trial. Of course, this fact has yet to be proven, and what’s more is that there are numerous examples of hostis humani generis or other terrorists being successfully tried and prosecuted (both in international and domestic courts).
Yet, this “go it alone” attitude coupled with a historical resistance to signing binding international agreements has not only strained America’s relations abroad but has helped to perpetuate in the minds of some an image of America as an imperialistic oppressor. Regardless of the validity of this perception, it has helped to undermine America’s operations abroad as terrorist organizations have used this image as a recruiting tool.
With regard to the International Criminal Court, what has kept America out are the tripartite fears that the Court could easily (because of its structure) become politicized, that it will compromise state sovereignty, and that, because of its ambiguous language (which might be seen as America’s root fear) regarding “acts of aggression” it might prosecute American soldiers.
While American policy makers have shown support of the ICC (in fact, America was initially in support of the Rome Statute in 1998) and have hinted that America might soon join—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently proclaimed that she “regrets” America’s status as a non-signatory to the Rome State—they have yet to cement their support for the Rome Statute (due to the aforementioned concern regarding “acts of aggression”). Yet, this step towards internationalism might be a necessary one if America is to renew its image and successfully secure its interests in the post-9/11 age.
