By Brian J. Forest, Contributing Editor
Whether or not Yulia Tymoshenko decides to concede defeat this week, one thing seems certain: Viktor Yanukovych, villain of the Orange Revolution, is likely to become Ukraine’s next president.
It’s a remarkable reversal of fortunes for a man who was all but counted out after losing an unprecedented third round of voting to outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko in 2004.
In the West, analysts have thrown up their hands wondering how it all went so wrong. While the economy—which recently contracted by an astounding 15 percent—was certainly a factor, many in this nation of 46 million are simply tired of the endless arguing between Yulia Tymoshenko and her one-time revolutionary ally Yushchenko.
Ukraine has the well-deserved reputation of a messy democracy. The Orange Revolution unleashed a torrent of chaos that the young republic was not ready for, and ostensible allies Yushchenko and Tymoshenko spent the better part of the post-revolution years bickering and, at turns, making up with one another.
Yushchenko agreed to appoint Tymoshenko as his prime minister in 2005 before firing her later that year. While Tymoshenko persuaded the president to help her become prime minister once more in 2007, the relationship again quickly descended into acrimony. Both Orange leaders then spent a great deal of effort attempting to undermine (and in Yushchenko’s case, fire) the other in advance of this year’s election.
The conflicts between the former allies have their roots more in personal than ideological concerns. Both are strongly supportive of Ukraine’s eventual entry into the European Union. Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine alliance and Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party are both linked with the same European political group, the center-right European People’s Party. Yet, where Yushchenko has been a consistent opponent of Russia and supporter of NATO membership, Tymoshenko recently staked a more ambiguous position—to the fury of the president. Her refusal to condemn Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia was met with accusations of treason from the president’s circle.
The incessant bickering led to an absurd number of snap elections—in 2006, 2007 and (almost) in 2008—and a near paralysis in policy, even on issues where agreement could have been expected. The result was sky-high inflation and an economy that nearly collapsed during the global recession. Many Ukrainians have simply turned their backs on the Orange leaders they had thrust into power with high hopes just a few years earlier.
Viktor Yanukovych’s impressive political turnaround came as a shock to many Western observers. It shouldn’t have. The Brooking Institution’s Steven Pifer recently noted that, “Yanukovych's return to political prominence after being cast aside following the Orange Revolution reflects the democratic space that Yushchenko created.”
Moreover, the president-elect never really faded from public life after his defeat in the Orange Revolution. He briefly served as prime minister from 2006-2007 and, as head of the pro-Moscow Regions Party, tended to his base in the Russian-speaking regions in the east of Ukraine. Those regions had never been fond of the Orange Revolution and strongly backed Yanukovych throughout the chaos.
Yanukovych’s base has consistently guaranteed between 44-48 percent of the vote to his allies in presidential and parliamentary elections since the revolution. This year, these regions again broke strongly for him, while Tymoshenko dominated in the pro-Orange west of the country. In a sign of just how polarized the nation remains, only four of Ukraine’s 27 regions were won by either candidate with less than 60 percent support. Maps with graphical representation of the results are even starker, with a deep red west for Tymoshenko, a dark blue east for Yanukovych and few shades of purple in between.
Ukraine remains as it was, a nation divided between the West and Russia. And that will be Yanukovych’s hardest task as he moves into the Mariyinsky Palace. He is supportive of membership of the European Union, if less enthusiastic than his Orange rivals, and is set to pursue pragmatic relations with the West. He is also unlikely to completely bow down to Moscow, despite his reputation as Russia’s choice in the election. Any talk of Ukraine joining NATO, however, is now unrealistic as long as he remains in power.
If he forces out Tymoshenko as prime minister and calls new parliamentary elections, as expected, it is far from certain he will be able to attain a plaint majority and appoint a premier of his choice. Compromise is likely to be the order of the day. Co-opting one of the Orange leaders into a broad coalition would be a difficult balancing act, but potentially worth the political price.
Doing so may result in accepting some demands Moscow will not like. It remains to be seen how independent Yanukovych is willing—or able—to remain from Russia. Russia was careful not to interfere directly in this year’s election. This strategy appears to have paid off, and Putin will be pleased with the result—for now.
Yanukovych’s rise to the presidency has been held up as the end of the Orange Revolution. In some respects, that is correct. Promised economic reforms and integration with the West are likely to slow or be shelved under the new president.
Yet, even with the leaders of the revolution out of power, the legacy of their ideas remains. The economy is freer than before and Ukrainians now accept their nation’s democratic path. Not only was the recent election deemed “professional, transparent and honest” by the OSCE, but Ukraine is the only former Soviet nation to earn a “fully free” rating from Freedom House.
In December, Ukraine’s foreign minister remarked that he was often asked to predict who would win the election. He replied, “For the first time, I can absolutely, frankly, say, I don’t know. And this is a very good symbol of democracy, when nobody knows who will win the election.”
If Tymoshenko does concede, she will underline the revolution’s core ideal: elections are now freely fought and won in the voting booth. Not on the streets, and not in smoke-filled rooms.
