By Russell Sticklor, Contributor
As the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan drags on, an increasing amount of attention has been focused on Pakistan’s role in the region—and for good reason. As Afghanistan’s more populous and powerful neighbor, Pakistan remains a crucial partner in U.S. efforts to disrupt and dismantle the Taliban and al Qaeda. For starters, Pakistan has facilitated the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by allowing the U.S. military to rout supply lines through its territory, ensuring that critical equipment, food, and other necessities reach U.S. troops in Afghanistan in a timely manner. Secondly, the Pakistani military has complemented the U.S. war effort over the years by launching periodic offensives against militants on Pakistani turf.
With Pakistan now trying to assume an even more active role in securing its side of the lawless Afghan-Pakistani border, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance is arguably more important than it has ever been. But at the same time, the partnership remains tense, and beset by mutual suspicion. Why? From a Pakistani perspective, one of the main reasons for distrusting the U.S. actually has little to do with Afghanistan. Instead, it stems from the U.S.’s increasingly tight relationship with one of Pakistan’s perennial enemies—India.
After India’s alliance with the Soviet Union dissolved following the Cold War, the U.S. began a courtship of the country that continues to this day. It isn’t surprising that the U.S. has sought common cause with India; in addition to being the world’s most populous democracy and a major U.S. trade partner, it is a geopolitical counterweight to a rising China. President Clinton noticed that potential, and oversaw some of the earlier efforts to reach out to India during his two terms in office. But the U.S.-Indian relationship didn’t really start to take off until the administration of President George W. Bush.
Under Bush’s watch, the U.S. and India developed closer ties in a number of areas, from trade to disease prevention. But one agreement struck between the two countries seemed to trump just about everything else: the landmark deal first announced in 2005 to share civilian nuclear technology, part of a broader U.S. pledge to help India develop as a nuclear power. (Controversially, the deal does not mandate that India limit the number of nuclear weapons it produces in the future, nor does it call for India to impose a cap on the amount of fissile material it creates.)
The pact immediately raised red flags in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Leaders there became suspicious of why the U.S. was assisting in the development of India’s nuclear capabilities, but not theirs. As a result, the U.S.-India nuclear deal sparked a heightened distrust of the U.S. on the Pakistani street that continues to this day.
During an October 7th talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi took exception to what he considers continued U.S. favoritism toward India in the realm of nuclear policy. He described the 2005 U.S.-India nuclear pact a “discriminatory agreement,” and asserted that the U.S.’ embrace of India has come at the expense of closer ties with Pakistan. Qureshi then defended his own country as a “responsible nuclear state” that had an “enlightened self-interest to be at peace with India.” Nevertheless, he insisted that nuclear exchanges between India and the U.S. have damaged Pakistani perceptions of America in significant ways. As a result, the India issue has emerged as a fault line that underlies and potentially undermines U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation.
Given Pakistan’s instability in recent years, it is understandable that the U.S. has not been keen on developing ties with that country in the nuclear realm. But Foreign Minister Qureshi’s skepticism of U.S. intentions is well-founded. Though the U.S. has long adopted nonproliferation as its mantra, its support of some nuclear states and demonization of others suggests a completely arbitrary enforcement of international standards. That is why it is fair for Pakistan to ask why India has benefitted from U.S. nuclear assistance, while Pakistan’s nuclear program has been held out as something of a pariah.
Foreign policy experts from both sides of the political aisle have been puzzled by the inconsistency of American nuclear policy in South Asia. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Carter, says he is “very uncomfortable about the nuclear deal” with India. “I think we are legalizing what might be called preferential and selective proliferation.” Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser to President George H.W. Bush, adds that the U.S.’ “emotional surge” toward India in the mid-2000s may have created more problems than it solved. “Obviously we embraced India very strongly,” he says. “As it turned out, that had negative implications for Pakistan. We're paying for that right now.”
How so? Consider that between 2002 and 2008, billions of dollars in U.S. aid earmarked for the Pakistani military went missing. While some of it was reallocated to provide economic subsidies for local industries, other portions went not toward enhancing Pakistan’s offensive capabilities against the Taliban or al Qaeda, but rather toward upgrading Pakistan’s military strength in ways better suited for a future conflict against India.
U.S. policy makers must recognize that even as Pakistan steps up its campaign against Islamic extremism, the country is still fighting an older and more deeply entrenched cold war against India. Unless the U.S. develops a more even-handed and inclusive nuclear policy toward the nations of South Asia, Pakistani support of the ongoing U.S. military campaign in the region will likely remain halfhearted.
