Is Lula da Silva Brazil’s Secret to Success?
By Babak Farrahi, Contributor
Brazil is gaining greater international recognition. The South American nation has secured a position in the G20, frequent participation in G8 summits, and—most recently—the 2016 Olympics. Many observers contribute Brazil’s current ascent to its economic success under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
Change was on the cards when Lula was elected in 2003. In his inauguration he declared: “Change: this is the key word,” and yet according to Dr. Alcides Costa Vaz, member of the University of Brazil’s Institute of International Relations, there was no radical change in Lula’s foreign policy objectives. Rather his administration adopted a subtle “rearrangement of some of its more basic features.”
The research of Brazilian scholars Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni concurs. They found that Lula’s policies implemented “no significant rupture” from the traditional aims for economic development and political autonomy. Indeed, they argued that the only change was “a change in the emphasis” in how to attain those aims.
Prior to Lula, Brazil sought autonomy through distance. This took the form of economic development through a solid domestic market, a relative non-committal approach towards great power politics, and hesitancy towards accepting the prevalent rationale of international regimes.
Vigevani and Cepaluni explain that under Lula, this policy brilliantly shifted to autonomy through diversification. Brazil has expanded its multilateral links by building regional and global alliances.
Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Foreign Minister, has pointed to the fact that most of Brazil’s trade is now with developing countries as evidence of the success of Lula’s policy. China has also become a significant actor and influential trading partner within the region.
Not everyone, however, is as enamoured with Lula’s approach. Some critics claim that it is returning Brazil to a Third-World mentality. Others argue that the nation is not doing enough to support the cause of democracy in the global “south.”
But by expanding its options, Brazil has made itself less vulnerable to unilateralism and less impacted by the global financial crisis. In fact, Brazil was one of the last countries to enter recession and one of the first to recover. Ultimately, by broadening its economic circle, Brazil has not become more dependent on other nations, but rather more autonomous.
In answer to accusations that Brazil’s relaxed relations do not urge democracy, Celso Amorim asserts that trade engagement between rich democratic nations and poorer ones is far more conducive of change than lectures. It may be, however, a sign of the tensions within the Foreign Ministry, where the current working arrangement is that Amorim handles the ‘technical’ aspects of the policy, whilst the ‘ideological direction’ is driven by Marco Aurelio Garcia, a special adviser, who was the foreign relations party secretary from 1996 to 2002, an appointment seen as a political concession to the party.
Ultimately, Lula’s administration subtle transitions in policy have not moved it away from the Brazilian historic tradition, but helped it to achieve at a more efficient and level.
As Lula did not present a dramatic sea of change in Brazilian diplomacy, it is safe to assume that there will be little difference following the election of a new president next year. Despite the fact that Lula’s preferred choice is his chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff has experienced several blows to her candidacy recently (to the benefit of her closest rival José Serra, the governor of São Paulo who currently enjoys a considerable lead in the polls). There are those that believe that Ms. Rousseff will ultimately prevail as she represents continuity, the preference of most Brazilians. This continuity would be one that would in all likelihood extend to foreign policy too.
