Mark C. Partridge, Contributing Editor
The Internet is an amazing invention, which allows anyone with a library card or a laptop to access troves of information—not all of it credible, mind.
Gideon Rachman, whom I often cite in my own missives, got a firsthand example of that variety and breadth of his readership after penning this column on the likelihood of a “world government.” After it was posted on the FT site, he was inundated with e-mails and comments of a “vituperative tone” for supporting a New World Order and trying to take away America’s guns.
The fascination with conspiracy theories about secret societies and powerful cadres using dubious, shadowy means to control finance and national governments is not a new phenomenon. In some sense, the tendency seems inherent to humans: in the absence of information, flawed conclusions inevitably form. And so it will continue in perpetuity.
Nevertheless, the idea of governments shedding their boundaries is an interesting one. (Indeed, I would guess his thesis was an intellectual exercise as much as anything else.) The trend towards larger, more global governance has continued for hundreds of years. (Think about 18th and 19th century Europe.) And certainly there are global challenges out there, of which financial systems, climate change and the terrorism are but three. Furthermore, instruments for confronting these threats will arise from the current crisis.
Yet, I am skeptical that “global governance” could “come much sooner than that [200 years],” as Gideon posits. For one thing, nationalism—the natural counterpoint to global government—is rising. Some leaders and peoples around the world have resented Washington’s chiding and hubris over the past two decade of American unipolarity. Russia has been re-establishing itself as a “great power”; few could miss the national pride on display when China hosted the Beijing Olympics this summer; while Hugo Chavez and his ilk have stoked the national flames with their anti-American rhetoric. The departing of the Bush Administration could cause this nationalism to abate, but economic uncertainty usually has the opposite effect.
Though centripetal forces exist in Europe—to the point where British politicians are even contemplating adopting the euro—nationalism has been growing on the Continent. Put a referendum about the EU Constitution in front of any populous and it gets voted down—most recently by the Irish, a nation that has done better than most under the EU. Even in the one region where supranational government is a success the trend is slowing, not speeding up.
Furthermore, the U.S. has its own spread of red-white-and-blue (as Gideon now knows.) But it is not just the Americans’ with guns and religion—and foreign commentators would do well to recognize this fact. One of the major reasons Barack Obama was elected is because he has promised to curb free trade, defend American jobs, and re-establish the middle class. For all his talk about diplomacy and foreign affairs, it was the economy that was the number one issue at the polls, and it was Obama’s command of the issue that won over many Republicans.
Another point is that attempts at global government and global agreements have been categorical failures. The WTO’s Doha Round is dead in the water, Kyoto excluded many of the leading polluters and a conference to establish a deal was a failure, and there is a race to the bottom in terms of corporate taxes—rather than an existing global framework. And, where supranational governance structures exist, they are noted for their bureaucracy and inefficiency: The UN has been unable to stop an American-led invasion of Iraq, genocide in Darfur, the slow collapse of Zimbabwe, or Iran’s continued uranium enrichment. That is not to belittle the structure, as I deem it essential, but the system’s flaws are there for all to see.
While global agreements and structures have fallen by the wayside, regional and bilateral agreements are on the rise. China has been making the rounds in South America and Africa setting up deals for oil and raw materials to fuel its massive (now stuttering) economy. The U.S. has taken a similar tact, most recently trying to push through a deal with Colombia.
Many are postulating over what the world will look like in the decades ahead. Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass believes there will be a non-polar world; Fareed Zakaria posits that the U.S. is still the most powerful force in the world, though others are becoming wealthier and advanced—the rise of the rest. While I have problems with Haass’ thesis, both are founded on the relative decline of the U.S., which seems to be correct in the current light.
Therefore, national governments do not seem up for the task, while supranational structures have been insufficient and ineffective. I would suggest that regional or multilateral structures will be the major force in the coming decade, so called pockets of power around regional centers. Western Europe around Brussels, the Western Hemisphere around Washington, East Asia around Beijing, and Eastern Europe around Moscow—if Putin gets his way. As such, the EU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Group of 20 will likely become more influential as time progresses.
The question then is not will global governance emerge, but rather how will these multinational blocs interact with one another.
