By Ezekiel Tan, Asia Contributor
The thawing of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in the recent years has led to the reconfiguration of local priorities within the troubled region of Jammu-Kashmir. Increased levels of socio-economic interaction and cooperation such as the momentous launch of a fortnightly cross-Line of Control (LoC) bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, and direct commercial flights between the two countries have ushered in a fragile status quo that enabled significant economic progress to take root. Younger generations are becoming increasingly hopeful about their future prospects in the region and even giving serious thoughts of venturing into India, Pakistan, or even elsewhere in the world to seek out their fortunes, which was before restricted to the privileged few.
The territory of Jammu-Kashmir has been a matter of contention between the Indian and Pakistani governments since the 1947 Partition. Islamabad has claimed that Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan in 1947 because of the territory’s overall Muslim majority, but New Delhi has repeatedly reasserted its legitimacy given by the document of accession to India that was signed by the last Maharajah of the territory. Two full scale wars between India and Pakistan and numerous violent skirmishes have occurred for quick resolution of this troubled region by force since 1947.
Many international observers and local people do yearn for a long term Kashmir settlement, but to formulate and materialize a settlement with the right set of terms and conditions is easier said than done.
If a peace settlement is ever achieved, it would bring about numerous mutual benefits for India and Pakistan. A committed settlement instills a stronger sense of permanency of peace and stability. Peace and stability would give rise to greater multi-level cooperation and partnership possibilities in areas ranging from various economic to social initiatives. India’s national security would be further enhanced by adopting Pakistan as a credible ally than an unpredictable enemy, and vice versa.
However, a Kashmir settlement would probably not include any sort of tangible independence within the Jammu-Kashmir region, which would almost definitely stir up rampant discontent among the different militants or “freedom fighters” still living among the people in the region. Consensus for a special status or autonomy of the sensitive region still needs to be refined, negotiated and worked out among various political parties and interest groups that sprung out in the past decade or so.
It is still an open question whether a special autonomous region status similar to the Chinese Hong Kong and Macau models would be sufficient to satisfy the diverse national needs of the local people. Despite the relative peaceful stability and economic progress in the past few years, suicide bombers continue to attack various governmental, public, and private institutions in both Pakistan and India in retaliation to the ongoing peace process.
At the same time, conservative factions in India continue to resist the materialization of a final Kashmir settlement. This is because a settlement would most definitely require India to relinquish its claim of legitimacy for the whole Jammu-Kashmir territory, and establish a mutually respected international border between India and Pakistan. As such, conservatives regard even the consideration of a final settlement as an indication of weakness of the Indian government, and fervently argue that the governmental regime is compromising India’s territorial integrity to a historically perceived weaker state.
There are also concerns that the settlement might set an unfavorable precedence in Indian history. If India is to give up its claim for the whole Jammu-Kashmir territory, it could possibly inspire other Muslim dominated parts of India to proceed with their own separatist movements hoping that their fight would eventually be rewarded someday like their Kashmiri brethrens. For the world’s third largest Muslim populated country, it is yet another hefty challenge, which will incur substantial costs for the sake of peace.
On the other hand, Pakistan has built much of its national identity based on religion and hatred of India since the 1947 partition. There are still significant portions of Pakistani citizens who are avid supporters of building a strong and militarily powerful Muslim state that counters India’s comparatively greater power and more abundant natural resources. They believe that India has robbed them of what is rightfully theirs, and cooperation between the two states is instinctively impossible.
Many perceivably insurmountable obstacles remained to be overcome by Pakistan, especially when heavily “fractured” elected civilian governments have repeatedly proven incapable to effectively govern the country. It is not extremely encouraging that withstanding developments in Pakistan normally took place during military rule for most part of the country’s history, and such an authoritative regime is usually frowned upon by both countries’ western allies. Moreover, the strength of the military and the religious faith are seen as the only reliable institutions in Pakistan. Civilian rule has only been proven weak and corrupt due to varying circumstances since the country’s independence.
Most people in both countries would agree that an all-out conflict between India and Pakistan is extremely undesirable and definitely not a viable option for final resolution of all their problems. Both countries have nuclear weapons and strong military capabilities which would eventually lead to mutual destruction (all losers and no winners).
At the end of the day, it really depends on the personalities present in the Pakistani and Indian leadership and whether they are faithful towards the confidence building measures and receptive towards the peace process. To some, what has happened since 2003 was largely due to Musharraf’s political maneuvering, implicit encouragement from the United States, and not the Pakistan’s divided fractions.
It remains questionable whether the peace process would continue or a peace settlement would even be attainable with the oftentimes unpredictable Indian and Pakistani domestic politics. Before the idea of a final settlement can become more than an illusion an effective and respected local government first needs to be in instituted to readily implement the tacit autonomy at a level that that India and Pakistan are both comfortable with.
