By Philipp Schweers, Contributor
Europe’s patience is exhausted after years of fruitless negotiations with Iran concerning the Iranian nuclear program. A negotiation group consisting of the so-called E3+3 group of Britain, France, and Germany, plus the United States, Russia, and China, have tried to bring Iran to halt its enrichment of uranium, a key stage in developing a nuclear weapon.
Sometimes with the stick—threatening Iran with substantial sanctions—sometimes with the carrot—offering extensive economic advantages—the diplomats from the group wooed Tehran to cooperate and to stop the nuclear program. Even though Iran has been assuring that its program has only civilian purposes, experts are underlining that the Iranian equipment is too small to fuel a nuclear reactor, but enough to create several bombs. However, after years of negotiations, sanctions and promises, the proceedings seem to fail.
Without any progress and rapprochement in essential strategic questions, the patient voices in the group are dying away and Europe’s position seems more and more undermined by Tehran´s stalling tactics.
Iran’s reply to the latest package of incentives is more than vague. Without a word on the central issues, namely a freeze on uranium enrichment in return for a freeze of sanctions, Iran is fostering the impression that it is playing for time with delaying tactics. After several European attempts to attract Tehran with packages of incentives and the outlook toward strategic and economic cooperation it seems that the positions are reaching a deadlock.
The Iranian position threatens to tear itself apart by zigzagging between signals for dialogue and the defiant nationalistic rhetoric or uncompromising positions of an untouchable great power.
On the one hand, Tehran strives towards international integration: due to demographic pressure and decades-long isolation, Iran is willing to participate in the regional economic prosperity. A high unemployment rate and stagnating economic growth in context to the booming development in Iran’s neighbours on the other side of the Gulf creates civil disturbance in the Iranian society and pressures the administration in Tehran to economic reforms and liberalization. Increasing domestic unrest and economic problems due to sanctions are threatening the governing Iranian authorities. These problems are weakening the legitimacy and political position of the dictatorial regime of the Islamic jurisconsults (Velayat-e Faqih) under Ayatollah Ali Khamnei.
On the other hand, the so-perceived omnipresent threat on its own borders allows Iranian authorities to oversubscribe to the nationalism of the Islamic Republic. Iranian foreign and security policy seems to be dominated above all by a fear of being surrounded by an external enemy. From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, from Iraq to the U.S. fleet in the Persian Gulf—the Iranian leadership clearly sees itself as encircled by more or less aggressively inclined powers.
With its uncompromising position during the negotiations, the administration under Mahmud Ahmadinejad tries to kill two birds with one stone.
Firstly, it seeks to externalize its domestic problems by provoking international pressure and isolation and using this pressure to fortify its political position and underline its ideology of Shiite-Persian Islamo-Nationalism. The regime counts on the collective memory of the society: the perception as well as the collective memory concerning the West is marked by distrust. This distrusts stems from incidents such as the CIA-led “Operation Ajax”—which deposed the elected government of the Iranian national hero Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953—or Western support for Iraq during the first Gulf War 1980-1988. Most of the Iranian society stays reticent and many assume imperialistic conspiracy behind every proposal by the West.
Secondly, Iran’s regime tries to seize a favorable strategic moment. As a result of the overthrow of the hostile Taliban-regime in 2001 and the overthrow of the Iranian archenemy, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran is now the geostrategic power of the region. Without Iraqi strategic containment and with a weak security structure in Afghanistan, Iran is the new hegemonial power in the greater Middle East. In context to the U.S. military engagements in two wars at once, Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran calculates that there will not be any sufficient effort against its own strategic demands. That is the reason why the Iranian authorities are using such a meandering negotiation-strategy. So long as the only military power in the region, the U.S., is engaged, Tehran will try to play for time, knowing well that this is maybe the only period they can promote their nuclear ambitions without strong intervention by the U.S.
The immediate result of Iran’s meandering strategy will be characterized by further sanctions. Even if agreement at the UN Security Council is not achieved due to China’s or Russia’s opposition against them; the lately exhausted and enervated EU has already agreed to them. Together, the Western powers will enforce extra sanctions. However, the hardline regime in Tehran is walking a dangerous tightrope. Iran should start substainable talking now.
Phillip is a Research Fellow at the Düsseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS) http://www.dias-online.org/
