By Samantha Brletich, Eurasia Contributor
With the recent tension in Georgia’s secessionist state, South Ossetia, the question has arisen how this conflict will be resolved. Can Macedonia and Estonia’s success in preventive diplomacy provide helpful examples?
Out of the five republics that comprised Yugoslavia, Macedonia was the only one that did not collapse into chaos. Situated between Greece and Serbia, Macedonia was destined to be hit hard by the political strife that saturated the region. It was anticipated that Serb forces were going to enter the republic stirring up a rebellion that would lead to the collapse of the Macedonian government. However, this did not occur even though Macedonia has a sizable Serbian population. Macedonia’s defense against Serbian forces can be attributed to preventive diplomacy, making Macedonia the model for preventive diplomacy.
Preventive diplomacy is a relatively new diplomatic strategy that prevents war or conflict in a country/region prone to violence by implementing preventive measures way before any signs of conflict begin to threaten the stability of a nation. Preventive diplomacy also serves to prevent the escalation of a conflict; it is designed to prevent the creation of a power vacuum thwarting any one party from engulfing and politically controlling a region by using the involvement of third parties such as the UN or NATO. Historically, preventive diplomacy is most effective in small-scale conflicts and has been utilized mainly in Europe.
After fragmentation occurred and war broke out in Former Yugoslavia, the United Nations deployed peacekeeping troops in Macedonia from 1995-1999. Macedonia was not free from the spill over of conflict in Yugoslavia. Although Macedonia has a small Serbian population, there was an attempt to create a Krajina-like state in Macedonia. The small Serb minority posed threats to Macedonia’s government by protesting for a referendum of sovereignty. Before it came to fruition, it was quelled by the government with the assistance of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Macedonia accommodated the ethnic Serbs by recognizing their cultural and nationalist-oriented rights. This included education in the Serbian language, freedom to worship, and to have radio and television programming in Serbian.
To prevent further outbreaks of militant Serbian independence within Macedonia, it was decided that a permanent solution must be devised. This was accomplished by collaboration between the Macedonian government, the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia (DPSM), and a working group specializing in ethnic and national communities. Legally, it was resolved by a statement in the newer Macedonian constitution, constitutionally recognizing the Serbs as a minority. Also, Macedonia’s proximity to Greece helped prevent an uprising due to Greece’s role in the region. The United Nations recognized the potential conflict in Macedonia, and with the aid of NATO, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force was able to create a coalition that was capable of controlling the situation militarily and politically. In Macedonia, it worked.
In another case, preventive diplomacy helped stop a conflict between former Soviet Republic and Baltic nation, Estonia and the Russian Federation. After Estonia gained independence, its government limited the influence of its large Russian population by passing legislation making Estonia the sole official language; requiring that elected officials speak Estonian. Estonians mandated that for any Russian to serve in a public position they must learn Estonian within a four-year period. The Russian population in Estonia in the year of 1995 was 30% of the population. Estonia’s citizens feared that the Russian population would outnumber their own, and would increase Russian influence in the country.
Members of the Soviet political system and military were not eligible for citizenship or naturalization. The Movement of Citizens Committee declared that the older Russians should have political rights and the right for Russians to receive citizenship by declaration were soon abolished thereafter. The restrictions placed on Russians by Estonians angered Russians. Russia retaliated by demanding a referendum repealing or lessening the effects of Estonia’s restriction on ethnic Russians, especially in Narva. As a result, anti-Estonian sentiment brewed in Russia.
To prevent the escalation of conflict, a permanent OSCE preventive mission was established on February 15, 1993 to promote understanding and communication between ethnicities in Estonia. This was achieved through dialogue between governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The OSCE mission continues to monitor the situation in Estonia and has resolved more issues of language and residency preserving the rights of ethnic minorities. The cases of Estonia and Macedonia show that the United Nations and its specialized agencies can use preventive diplomacy to reduce the chances of conflict.
Georgia is no stranger to conflict. The current situation in South Ossetia is made more difficult since there has already been violence and fatalities. The fact that South Ossetia is a breakaway republic provides another obstacle because the ownership of the republic is disputed. Although the republic is pro-Kremlin, it lies within Georgia’s demarcated borders and is an issue of territorial integrity for Russia and Georgia. Geographically, South Ossetia is a part of Georgia. Politically, it is sovereign because it declared independence once the Soviet Union fell.
Once Russia pulls out of Georgia, there will be a chance to set up a preventive operation; but, can it be successful? Given that South Ossetia is a breakaway republic, it would be complicated to set up a mission because there would be the issue of who is included in the peacekeeping force. Georgia could permit a peacekeeping mission to be built. However, Russia has South Ossetia’s loyalty and would block any heavy Western influence. It is evident that South Ossetia’s attitudes are compatible with Russia’s, supporting any Russian proposals, leaving Georgia and its Western allies powerless.
In the Macedonia model, the Macedonian government accommodated the Serbs and recognized their nationalist-oriented rights. In Georgia, this action would be two-fold. It is highly unlikely that Georgia will do this. If they would have done this early on, the squabble would have never occurred. On the other hand, if they would have been recognized, Georgia would still push for complete independence stating they are a nation with a level of autonomy that makes them sovereign.
The involvement of third parties is essential. However, the agents involved in a South Ossetian campaign would be met with resistance. Russia would complicate things further. Russia has often butted heads with the United Nations, the European Union, and has open and unwavering contempt for NATO. Without these agents, a preventive strategy would ultimately fail. Within the doctrine of preventive diplomacy, preventive diplomacy must be used before military action is reached. As of right now, preventive diplomacy cannot be implemented with the usual actors, but after a cease-fire is brokered early warning signs will be noticed. There could be a chance for preventive diplomacy to work if the external actors are different.
For a peacekeeping mission to take place there must be open dialogue. This is not feasible. The strong rhetoric emanating from Moscow and Tbilisi is not indicative of cooperation. With Russia reasserting itself and its disdain for NATO, it is anticipated that any peacekeeping mission will be interrupted by Russia or Russia will demand that it take the leading role or increase its number of peacekeepers in the region. This would provide Russia the opportunity to reassert itself in the so-called Soviet sphere upsetting the power structure and agreements in the region.
As reports come in, it is doubtful that any type of long-lasting peace accord will be reached. Russia’s rationale of defending ethnic minorities in South Ossetia is somewhat noble, but is often viewed as sophistry. Georgia’s move to go in to South Ossetia without provocation from South Ossetia is questionable, and leaves open many questions. Preventive diplomacy would force otherwise non-interventionist states to be involved. The use of an independent peacekeeping force would be best, but Russian relations with South Ossetia would prevent it.
