While many had high hopes for Lebanon after the end of the Syrian presence in 2005 today it is clear that Lebanon is a deeply troubled land. Last year’s war with Israel left 1,200 civilians dead and greatly increased Hizbollah’s support, from which it is still profiting, while greatly damaging the country’s infrastructure and leaving it in debt.  The political situation has been marred by repeated assassinations and a deadlock in the parliament between the pro-Western majority and the pro-Syrian opposition, led by Hizbollah. Meanwhile there is evidence of an emerging jihadist element, as evidenced by the roadside bomb attack which killed six UN peacekeepers from the multi-national force. 

 

Adding to the challenges of the Siniora government, the Lebanese army has been battling jihadist guerillas in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian camp that have killed more than 160 people and caused most of the 30,000 refugees to flee.  Already challenged by the presence of Hizbollah’s competing forces in the country, the outcome of the al-Bared siege will have important repercussions for the national army and the embattled Siniora government.  However, this is largely a distraction, the main battle being the continued struggle for control of Lebanon and its government.  The parties have been unable to agree on a new unity government since six opposition ministers from Hizbollah and the Amal movement quit last November and it remains to be seen whether international mediation, such as France’s efforts to host talks, will break the political stalemate. 

Hizbollah has been maintaining its efforts to bring down the Siniora government by organizing large demonstrations calling for its resignation and organizing a general strike in January. The upcoming presidential election scheduled for September is proving to be another point of conflict because a two-thirds parliamentary vote is required but the parliament is currently not in session.  Hizbollah’s supporters argue that two thirds of the entire body must vote. The pro-Western majority, however, interprets it as a vote based solely on those members who are present during the session. Several politicians have called for a popular election and Hizbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah has suggested a national referendum along with the holding of early parliamentary elections, which may well turn out to benefit the opposition.

The pro-West majority blames Syrian influence for the existing crisis and assassinations, claiming they are part of a campaign designed to regain its role in the country. Hizbollah claims that the violence is part of a wider effort by Western and Sunni Arab states to pressure Syria and Iran. It is likely that the real source lies in the long existing political cleavages along sectarian lines and the fragmented nature of Lebanese politics. Such circumstances have bred conflict over control of the government as each faction views outcomes to be a zero sum game in relation to its own interests and elections as conferring power to one at the expense of others. But Lebanon’s current problems do not necessarily indicate a return to the type of rivalry which caused the 1975 civil war because the current divide is based more on politics than on sectarianism and it is far more stable with coalitions on both sides of the divide.

With the emergence of al-Qaeda sympathizing jihadist groups Lebanon has taken a turn for the worse. But while they may currently serve the goals of Hizbollah, posing a challenge for the Lebanese army, there will be little vacuum to fill in the future political scene. Either the current government will prevail and wipe out the new terrorist elements or it will be brought down by Hizbollah, which also has no desire for competition or instability caused by other groups. The more trouble these elements cause the greater the likelihood that supporters of both sides will call for Hizbollah and the army to eradicate them. External influences are more of a problem since most parties have outside backing which impacts their ability to find compromise on a unity government, along with the continuing influence of Syria. Western countries have been propping Siniora, hoping his government can hang on, while Iran and Syria clearly support Hizbollah and its allies.  Thus, Lebanon has become a battleground in the larger struggle between the U.S. and Iran, exacerbating internal problems.

Looming in the background is the continuing tension with Israel which is still smarting from its poor performance during last summer’s war. Independent of who wins in the current conflict, Lebanon will still have to deal with the fundamental problems posed by Hizbollah in or out of government and so will the West. As long as no unity government exists Beirut will continue to be the scene of demonstrations, the government will be gridlocked, and sectarian tensions will rise. Conversely, a government that includes Hizbollah will never have peace with Israel, especially since the faction sees profit in perpetuating the conflict. After last summer’s war Hizbollah proclaimed victory and saw a swelling in its support, a motivator for it to provoke further hostility between Israel and Lebanon. 

The West is also struggling to reconcile its desire for a stable democratic Lebanon and the goal of reducing Hizbollah’s influence in the country by supporting the Siniora government. But this policy has considerable risk—the devil you know versus the devil you don’t. A unity government that gives considerable power to the opposition would not be in the West’s interest but the possibility of what could come should the current government fall is an even less appealing prospect. Instead of focusing on the outcome of the current problems the U.S. and other states should make efforts to work on a long term resolution to the Hizbollah dilemma, but that road would take them first through Tehran and Damascus. In order to bring Hizbollah into the fold and avoid the current lose-lose scenario the West must first reach an understanding with Syria and Iran because Hizbollah’s internal support is long established and genuine—no effort to influence Lebanese politics will change these facts.