9 October 2007: Washington, DC -- On September 26, 2007, the Senate overwhelmingly approved an amendment in support of federalism in Iraq. Amendment 2997, put forth by Senator Joseph Biden, D-Del., expresses congressional support for a three-state solution for the country, with borders reflecting the regional boundaries of the major ethnic groups: the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites.

The non-binding amendment, passed 75-23, immediately stirred a debate in the United States and in the Middle East on what federalism would mean for Iraq, the region and for U.S. forces. In the short term, could a three-state solution provide an exit for U.S. forces and end sectarian violence? In the long term, could it create a stable Iraq with a sustainable political, economic, and social infrastructure?

These questions ring a familiar bell.  About 10 years ago international negotiators seeking to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina contemplated a similar solution. In order to stop the ethnic-spurred violence, a plan was devised to separate the Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the Bosnian Serbs, similar to what is currently being proposed for Iraq. Under the Dayton Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two semi-autonomous entities but remained united by a central government.

The division, at the time, was seen by many as the best solution for peace. But now, the country finds itself in political stalemate.  Essential issues to a healthy civilian infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as establishing a national police force and constructing a national highway, continually stall due to failure from the two political entities to reach common ground. “The status that Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoys is more stasis than stable,” says Lindsay Lloyd, Regional Program Director for Europe at the International Republican Institute.

The Biden amendment stated that federalism in Iraq “could lead to an Iraq that is stable.” However, as Lloyd notes in regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, dividing a state into separate entities, still united by a form of a central government, does not necessarily lead to stability. If this course is pursued by the powers in Iraq, the challenge would be to create a central government that fosters collaboration between the three states, rather
than inhibiting it—an issue still present in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “It’s all in how you do the partition that’s really crucial. If you do it wrong, you have a disaster on your hands,” says Ivan Eland, director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Though Eland was referring to Iraq, the same could be argued for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

An important issue delaying Bosnia-Herzegovina’s progress is its failed attempts to build a national police force. The importance of a national police force is twofold: it will cause the gradual independence from international security forces still deployed in the region and it will lend Bosnia-Herzegovina credibility from the European Union.

Officials from Republika Srpska, one of the entities created by the Dayton Accords, have clashed with the central government and international community insisting that the entity retain control over their own police. In contrast, Bosnian Muslims want the entire police force of Republika Srpska dissolved. “Keeping the Srpska police intact is like allowing the Gestapo to police Holocaust victims,” said Haris Silajdzic, the Muslim representative in the country’s three-pronged presidency, as reported by the Washington Post.

Similarly, in Iraq, U.S. officials have stated the importance of a strong national security force as a condition to leaving the country and establishing a stable government. Currently in Iraq, there is a national police force, though its effectiveness is questionable. If a division were to occur, an already weak national police force might undoubtedly get weaker. By dividing ethnic groups politically, people might be less likely to support federal security measures out of the belief that only their own can provide protection. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to results from a poll conducted in part by the International Republican Institute, politics are fueled by ethnicity.

However, a stronger central government might not be a better solution. “In Iraq, the fear is that the central government will be used by one group to suppress another, a weak central government will take away the fear,” said Eland, adding that he supports a “soft” partition with a weak central government, even weaker than in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite the long-term implications from dividing Iraq, it is one solution that may help end the violence, which from a humanitarian point of view, is the first priority. “It may be the most pragmatic solution available that would foster U.S. withdrawal, reduce sectarian violence, and give Iraq the best hope for peace and prosperity,” said Eland.

Dividing Iraq has been presented as a serious solution for the conflict.
The United States, however, should consider if it would improve the ability
of the Iraqi government to make the reforms that it needs to make to
move forward or if it will set the country up for political stalemate. Perhaps division is the answer; it is just the details that—as Eland noted—are crucial to its success. 

But it may not be as simple as “look into the details.” Bosnia-Herzegovina has the EU and EU accession to look forward to for its future, and a strong presence of European officials to answer to. But, Iraq may not have the regional influence to keep it in check, nor the democratic neighbors to
aspire to.