November 5, 2007: Washington, DC -- On September 6, 2007 a squadron of Israeli jets struck a target deep in Syrian territory approximately 145km from the Iraqi border. What followed was a complete information blackout on the part of all governments involved which proved revealing as to the actual importance of the operation. Israel and the U.S. made no initial comment. Syria, however, first claimed that the jets attacked an empty area and then later took the official position that the strike hit an unused military facility. The Syrians have since remained conspicuously quiet. On September 8 Turkey requested an explanation from Israel regarding drop tanks found on its territory just north of the Syrian border indicating the exit route. News stories and various accounts had begun investigating the attack and slowly but surely a convergence has appeared as to what actually transpired that day.

While several hypotheses existed as to the purpose of the mission, information leaks from unknown news sources (that later turned out to be U.S. officials) suggested the target to be an unfinished nuclear reactor under construction. Satellite imagery provided by ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security) and supported by other organizations, showed a large square building with sides 47 meters in length near the city of At Tibnah. Although details remain clouded due to varying reports, with some indicating that an IAF commando team was actually on the ground marking the targets, it is clear that Israel was successful and that the target was destroyed in an attack by 6-8 fighters, which penetrated Syrian air defenses.

Although unproven, appearances suggest that in the end the operation had American consent, unlike the 1981 Osirak strike when the U.S. had no warning of Israel’s intentions. According to sources referred to in the Washington Post, Israel had presented evidence of long existing cooperation between Syria and North Korea to the U.S. and internal debate had been ongoing over the course of the summer as to whether Syrian progress on construction of the facility necessitated military action. Based on several reports, nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea had been ongoing since 2001 and the facility was the product of technology transfers dating years ago. This relationship was clearly unknown to U.S. intelligence, reflecting a considerable lapse during its period of attention on Iraq, which in the end was not proven to have reconstituted a nuclear program. The extent of collaboration between Syria and North Korea is still being investigated and it remains unknown whether it will affect current negotiations with Pyongyang. Israel’s attack has revealed that a great deal is still unknown about the extent of nuclear proliferation ongoing since North Korea acquired the capability.

Imagery analysts have stated that the box-shaped facility is a match for a 25 watt North Korean reactor, using gas-graphite and capable of producing enough plutonium for one nuclear weapon per year. Perhaps most revealing was the existence of a pumping station connected to the building, likely used in a cooling process, without which the structure would have appeared to have no clear purpose. Thus, by all accounts Syria was building a model replica of a well-known reactor in Yongbyon in an attempt to initiate its own while at the same time being a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty. The country was still within its right not to declare the facility until fully constructed and operational. But all evidence, and the Syrian silence, points to the inception of a clandestine program along the North Korean path.

One of the major mysteries that remains about this incident is why Israel chose its time of attack given that it would have taken Syria many years to produce any useable spent fuel from the reactor once it was completed and operational. Some have suggested the attack was precipitated by the arrival of a North Korean ship at the port of Tartus, on September 3, carrying additional materials for the construction of the reactor labeled as cement also leaving questions as to what the North Koreans were delivering. Even so, Syria would have had to build the infrastructure to separate the plutonium and at the end acquire the technology to create an implosion device creating little urgency in the matter and the IAEA has chided Israel for not having provided the intelligence or attempted an international inquiry first. This has become the second known case of Israeli nuclear preemption, following the Osirak reactor strike in Iraq, when the government chose to destroy a reactor being constructed by the French and represent the continuation of a unilateral policy. It is also a clear warning to Iran about the seriousness of Israel’s intent to prevent the emergence of a hostile nuclear power in the Middle East.