Conservative critics have derided the deal saying that carrots are not the policy tool to get Kim Jong-il to give up his nuclear weapons. Former U.S. ambassador to the UN John Bolton, who has been particularly forthright with his opinions on this topic, has said that the deal is “very bad … It sends exactly the wrong signal to would-be proliferators around the world: if you hold out long enough and wear down the State Department negotiators, eventually you get rewarded.”

Even with some turbulence (read: Syrian nuclear sites) along the way, the U.S. does not look to be changing tack towards a more hard-line negotiating position. The back story here is the changing face of the Bush Administration. Out are the likes of Donald Rumsfeld, Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, et al. These changes have allowed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and those at the State Department to assert themselves more in policy decisions, after being famously sidelined by bureaucratic tag team of Vice President Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld. Do not get fooled into thinking officials over at Foggy Bottom are weaklings though.

While North Korea has been getting economic aid—despite its best efforts to disrupt even these efforts—what the Dear Leader really want is access to international finance markets. For this to happen, the country needs the sanctions against it lifted. The agreement signed in October was carefully worded, saying only that the U.S. would “begin the process” of removing the North from the state-sponsor of terror list and terminate the Trade with the Enemy Act as it pertains to Pyongyang. Last week, that note was struck again by the U.S.’s lead negotiator in the six party talks, Christopher Hill, who said: “The sanctions are there until the DPRK [North Korea] gets out of the nuclear business.” As David Francis at FP’s Passport notes, this means that “the sanctions will stay in place at least until North Korea’s nuclear program no longer exists—a process that could take years.”

So while the U.S. is continuing to negotiate with the North, it is not capitulating to all of North’s demands—and certainly not without some reciprocity. There is no doubt that the U.S. is weaker than it had been before Pyongyang got its nuclear toys. But then again, so is the North: it has become more isolated, with even close allies like China offering criticism for its actions; also, the country has been crippled economically by sanctions and must begin turning things around.