10 December, 2007: Washington, DC -- The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear weapons program has put the White House in an uncomfortable position, contradicting previous intelligence assumptions made in 2005 and much of the pointed U.S. political rhetoric since 2003.
It’s been a difficult week for U.S. foreign policy. The revelation that Iran’s government had halted its allegedly covert nuclear weapons program four years ago—and judged to be far less determined to acquire a nuclear weapon—has introduced a new dynamic into the long running political standoff between Washington and Tehran. U.S. credibility has been undermined, raising questions as to the validity of any American claims regarding Iran’s nuclear activities. This will undoubtedly dent U.S. efforts to sustain support for sanctions against the Iranian regime and has already begun calls within Congress for a new policy approach based on last weeks’ findings. Although the White House has yet to show any serious change in its tone, with members already attempting to qualify the NIE in a damage control effort, its new judgments are quickly pulling the rug out from under the Bush administration.
Having learned from its shortcomings in the case of Iraq, the U.S. intelligence community instituted a more rigorous process in examining new evidence regarding Iran’s nuclear program. This represents a thorough analysis of potential disinformation, gaps in intelligence, and judgments made by individual analysts. Communication intercepts and other intelligence sources suggested that previous Iranian attempts to refit the Shahab III missile for a nuclear payload, termed Project 1-11 and forming the basis for the 2005 assessment, had been halted along with undeclared enrichment programs.
According to the Washington Post, the intercepts revealed that members of the military and government were in fact complaining over the shutdown of weaponization work in 2003 and debating a possible restart. More importantly, this had occurred due to “increasing international scrutiny” and pressure after the program was first exposed. The sharp policy change reflects “cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.” Hence, despite attempts to characterize the regime as irrational and determined to acquire nuclear weapons, the regime has actually been responsive to international pressure and potentially willing to forgo nuclear ambitions altogether if presented with other means of achieving its goals.
However, the new NIE did confirm the long running assumption that Iran was violating its international obligations with parallel work on nuclear weapons prior to 2003 and given its current progress, could still acquire the technology by 2009. Of course, this is highly unlikely and the intelligence community continues to assert that 2013-15 is the most probable timeframe for when Iran will resolve its current technical difficulties with the gas centrifuge process and will be able to indigenously produce enough HEU for a weapon.
Tehran has not emerged clean from the new findings. Continued international pressure appears both legitimate and necessary in raising the policy costs for those in the regime arguing for a restart of covert enrichment. What is unclear is why the Bush administration maintained its harsh rhetoric when the DNI Mike McConnell informed the President in August that new intelligence pointed to a long running halt of Iran’s program. Since last week the White House has begun refocusing its language, stating that Iran’s work on dual use “know-how” and ballistic missile technology is the main problem justifying American skepticism of the regime’s intentions.
As the political fallout settles, the story has given something to both camps in the U.S. government. Whatever basis lay behind the military option in dealing with Iran has been completely undermined by the new NIE, along with the harsh tone many hawks were pushing. But confirmation of previous Iranian violations has validated the argument that Iran cannot be trusted. Even more so, American pressure has been successful in changing Tehran’s course, but international consensus for maintaining sanctions may fall apart, with China already questioning their necessity given the recent U.S. intelligence. Although European allies continue to support a third round of sanctions, they had little warning on the new information and are clearly displeased having not been informed of the findings in the NIE. It is likely a new policy debate will begin in Congress and within the policy making community as international consensus begins to crack and the U.S. is unable to sustain pressure on Iran.
If the IAEA has been accurately discerning the facts on the ground for the past several years, there is no basis to doubt that for all intents and purposes Iran has been complying with the bulk of the requests, providing information that has been corroborated with regard to its inventory and use of nuclear material, as well as detailing the history of its program and its acquisition and use of P1/P2 centrifuge designs. While it is true the IAEA continues to seek fewer restrictions on site access and the full implementation of the Additional Protocol, its November 15 report paints a regime that has been largely cooperative. Of course, it is important to note that Tehran refuses to suspend uranium enrichment according to UN Security Council demands and has made evident its determination to succeed in enrichment work despite sanctions. But there is little evidence for the White House to use in maintaining a military option. In all respects the IAEA appears successful in its mission to investigate, inspect, and make transparent Tehran’s programs.
The broader context of U.S.-Iranian relations makes for a challenging policy environment. While meetings on security issues in Iraq show some thaw in relations there has been little substantive change in decades of animosity. Iran continues to undermine U.S. efforts in Iraq by supplying shaped explosives to the insurgency, maintains its support of terrorist groups, upholding a desire to destroy Israel, and working to export its revolution in an effort to undermine U.S. friendly regimes in the Middle East. Its goal to become a regional power and influence Iraq’s future are diametrically opposed to U.S. interests in the region and American desire for regime change in Iran leaves little purpose for direct negotiations over any specific issue. As long as these conditions continue little change can be expected and some have suggested that the ongoing confrontation over the nuclear issue is largely based in Iran’s continued intent to publicly challenge the U.S. and defy its allies.
What has been a policy composed solely of sticks and long lasting bitterness has resulted in years of lost opportunity to deal with what appears to be a pragmatic government, driven by rational power considerations, and capable of changing its behavior. The U.S. now has the chance to seize on Iran’s cessation of the weapons program and present it with real alternatives that avoid a possible military confrontation with an approach focused on appeasing the regime’s security fears and offering tangible benefits leading to better relations. In order to do this the U.S. must first accept that Iran will inevitably develop enrichment technology and has a role as a major power in the region whose claim to influence cannot be ignored. A serious policy would work to solve more urgent issues such as Iraq, where Iranian activity is beginning to shape into a dangerous proxy war that has the serious potential of turning into military confrontation. Iran will likely be satisfied with having the technology to obtain weapons should it choose to, without actually having them, but not if the U.S. maintains policies that exacerbate its security concerns and ignore its desire for greater power in the region.
To interact with the writers, email us your comments at: editors@diplomaticourier.org |
