14 November 2007: London, UK -- I went to a conference on U.S. foreign policy last week and in the course of the discussion—as you might expect—the current crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambitions came up. A leading British academic on U.S. policy expressed his chagrin at the lack of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran.

This is a common criticism of the United States, and particularly the Bush Administration, in European circles. In their opinion, the U.S. looks at full diplomatic relations (e.g. embassies) as a reward—or “carrot” if you prefer—for good behaviour on the part of states, rather than the fundamental instruments through which countries communicate with one another. The thinking goes, therefore, that the U.S. does not have the tools to interact with nations that are integral players on the world stage, thereby exacerbating conflicts and tensions.

The case of Iran is instructive. Following the hostage crisis in 1979, the U.S. closed its embassy in Tehran and diplomatic relations have been rancorous ever since. Since then, the U.S. has relied on backchannels and intermittent secret talks to communicate with their Persian adversary. The lack of direct contact between officials from Washington and Tehran came into play in April 2003. With the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq well underway, a fax arrived at the State Department from the Swiss ambassador to Iran outlining a grand bargain for the Middle East, including promises from Iran for “decisive action against any terrorists… full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information” and to “stop material support to Palestinian opposition groups” including Hezbollah and Hamas. In the opinion of some, these concessions could prove decisive in Washington’s attempt to remake the Middle East in its image. According to some reports, U.S. officials believed that Iranian reformers, like President Mohammad Khatami, were overreaching and would not be able to deliver on these pledges. (In the interest of full disclosure, I am currently working with Greg Barker and Silverbridge Productions, the company that put together this Frontline report).

The U.S. did not respond to this offer and instead chose to lodge of formal complaint with the Swiss government for meddling in American affairs. In actual fact, it seems that the reformers were not overreaching at all; the proposal had been passed along to the Swiss ambassador by Sadeq Kharrazi, the son-in-law to the supreme leader the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had apparently approved it.

Some officials reject this account saying that Tehran was harbouring Al Qaeda operatives and was not cooperative as much as is being reported. Additionally, the ubiquitous presence of Administration infighting, with the Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney resisting negotiations, obviously played a role in the rejection—then Secretary of State Colin Powell has said that he “couldn’t sell it to the White House.”

So, as is my wont, I have a host of questions for you readers: Did the fax fall by the wayside because of political infighting or because of the lack of direct diplomatic relations between Iranian and American officials? Would full relations between the two sides be a tonic for the current crisis? Should the U.S. rethink its stance on full diplomatic relations with nations that it is in conflict with? And if so, what circumstances would likely be needed to reopen relations with the likes of Iran and North Korea?