3 March 2008: So it’s official; yesterday saw Dmitry Medvedev, current President Vladimir Putin’s preferred successor, chosen by nearly 70% of the Russian electorate to lead the country.

Medvedev’s election was never really in doubt after Putin gave him the nod last December. The election was largely a referendum on the Putin presidency; the current president enjoys approval ratings in the 80s because the Russian economy has recovered under his watch and the country is now re-emerging as a power on the world stage. Whomever Putin anointed would have almost certainly won.

However, as is the Kremlin’s way, the deck was heavily stacked in Medvedev’s favor, just to ensure that everything went according to plan.

Even before election day arrived, the signs were evident. The Russian bureaucracy was expertly used to frustrate international observes, who eventually decided that they could not properly monitor the vote with the limited number of officials who were belatedly allowed entry into the country. The lack of observers was felt on polling day, if reports are to be believed, with various tactics being used on Medvedev’s behalf, including intimidation and ballot stuffing.

Potential rivals were undermined as well. The major opposition parties refused to even participate in the elections, while former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was barred from running because he was found to have forged many of the signatures on his petition to be on the ballot. Those candidates that were allowed to contest the election were seen as weak or marginal figures. They even served to further undermine the seriousness of the election; during a debate, one of the candidates, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, accosted another, threatening to rip his head off and have him shot. (Best of all, it was caught on camera.)

Medvedev also enjoyed the support of the state-owned media, which granted him far more favorable coverage than his competitors. The government and its supporters own many of the major news outlets in Russia and the bias in reporting has been evident for all to see. Indeed, even Vladimir Churov, the head of the country’s electoral commission, acknowledged to the BBC that the coverage has been “fair, but not equal.”

All of these advantages meant that Medvedev felt the need to officially campaign one day only, focusing instead on his duties as deputy prime minister. This did not stop the candidate tethering hopes to the Putin star. During Medvedev’s public appearances, Putin’s presence was visceral—even when he was not there—with his visage plastered across banners and billboards.

The lack of transparency and freedom in this election is a sad condemnation on Russia’s democracy today. But is it also a condemnation of the future of Russia’s democracy?

The answer to this question seems to hinge on two factors. The first is what direction will the new president try to take the country?

Medvedev campaigned largely on a more liberal platform than his predecessor, waxing: “Freedom is better than non-freedom.” He is also seen as more amenable to the West than the assertive Putin.

However, Kremlin’s new leader has also pointed out that his policies would be “a direct continuation of that path which is being carried out by President Putin.”

The other factor will be Medvedev’s ability of control the Byzantine institution that is the Kremlin, given its numerous factions.

One of Putin’s greatest skills was to juggles these interest groups, ensuring that none got to be too powerful. However, there is a new player on the scene: the master himself. Medvedev has already offered Putin, a former KGB operative, the position of prime minister and analysts note that the latter will likely serve to shield his protégé from other factions.

Yet, there are potential areas of conflict as the two men redefine both their relationship and the sources of authority within the Russian government. Commentators of all strips have predicted that Putin will retain a great deal of power, though from a lower perch, on a range of issues, including foreign policy. But upon his victory, Medvedev, the former Gazprom chairman, asserted his claim to this area, noting: “the president defines Russia's foreign policy according to the constitution.”

What all this means for Russia, and for its standing in the global community, will only become clear with time—something of a maxim when it comes to analysing the Kremlin.

However, that is not a sufficient reason to stifle discussion: Who will have power in the new Russian government? Will there be a changing in foreign policy under the new president or will the same assertive tendencies hold? How should government in the West and around the world react to the newly elected Medvedev?

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