21 February, 2008: It seems that not a day goes by without hearing a report on a cable news program or reading a story in a newspaper which references a tragedy in Iraq and identifies its source “insurgents.” While the notion of the insurgency in Iraq is becoming more and more ubiquitous in the international media, its actual nature and the individuals which comprise it continue to be abstract concepts to most people. In order to truly understand what’s happening “on the ground” in Iraq, one must break down this single term which encapsulates a large number of groups and positions into its diverse and mysterious parts.

One of the key components comprising this movement is also the one with the most historical importance. Iraqi tribes, the power and influence of which are embodied in their sheiks, represent simultaneously a tool to be used by Coalition forces in controlling the periphery and a threat to the new central government’s hold over rural areas.

Tribes and tribal groupings were extremely important in Iraq during the time of the Hashemite monarchy, to the point where many considered them to be a major pillar which held the monarchy up. When the Ba’thists came to power in 1963, they immediately began trying to eradicate the sheiks, considering them to be vestiges of the past and challenges to the central government’s authority among the peasants. Part of this strategy was to keep any mention of the sheiks out of the mass media. There was, however, a distinct shift in 1991, when the tribes were given more attention in the national media and by 2003 Saddam Hussein had officially recognized about 7,200 sheiks and held them firmly under his control.

By the time the Unites States invaded, however, the tribes were harboring ill will towards Al-Qaeda and were open to working with Coalition officials. By 2005, the Coalition had figured out a way to systematically engage tribal leaders to make their job easier. Experts in the field, however, warn that the United States and its allies must be careful to strike a delicate balance. “You are riding a tiger. It is a kind of art,” says Dr. Amatzia Baram, professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa, Israel, “they are the blade runners between the central government and the tribes, and between the tribes themselves.”

The second component central to the insurgency is made up of both a charismatic individual and his loyal followers. This group is known as the Sadrists, a Shia Islamist political party led by Muqtada al-Sadr, an important Iraqi religious and political figure. Al-Sadr’s ultimate goal is to become a supreme Islamic leader and in the short-term is vying for control of Iraq’s government.

Those monitoring and studying al-Sadr’s progress, such as Dr. Reidar Visser, a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, draw attention to that fact that at this moment al-Sadr’s quest is “essentially stalled.” This is because there are two routes one could take to reach this position: to become a mujtahid, or Islamic scholar who makes decisions based on interpretations of Islamic law, or a muqallid, a jurist authorized to make rulings based on the judgments of mujtahids. Right now, al-Sadr is technically neither, though he appears to be taking steps towards remedying this situation.

Scholars such as Dr. Visser are choosing to pay special attention to the future of this movement and how it will affect the Coalition’s attempts to establish stability within the region. He advises that the Coalition should “deal with the Sadrists independently rather than allowing the Iraqi government to serve as an intermediary,” since the government is often caught up in in-Shia politicking.

Finally, there are the groups most commonly referred to as insurgent groups. These factions can be divided into unique groups with different goals and outlooks and broad trends simultaneously affecting them all can be identified. Sam Parker, a program officer at the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, has identified three such trends.

The first trend is what Parker refers to as “The Great Consolidation,” or the process of diverse insurgent groups coming together to form four distinct entities. These groups include: The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Qaeda, which have a broad international Islamist focus; The Political Council of Iraqi Resistance which represents the coming together of at least six disparate insurgent groups focusing solely on resisting the new Iraq government; The Front for Jihad and Change which is a coalition of eight factions and refer to themselves as the “Iraqi Patriots”; and The High Command of Jihad and Liberation, which is essentially a Ba’athist group in all but name.

The second trend is that there has been a general turn in sentiment against Al-Qaeda by the other groups as a result of perceived aggression on Al-Qaeda’s part.

Finally, the third trend is that all of these groups are moving away from merely reactionary violence and adopting legitimate and thought-out political platforms and goals.

While the task to try to comprehend such a nuanced and complex movement is daunting, it is a necessary step towards discovering the truth about what’s happening in Iraq so we may better address security issues in the country.