13 February 2008: The process of isolating Iran, both economically and politically, in an attempt to stop Islamic Republic’s pursuit of nuclear power—which it claims are for peaceful purposes—has been an arduous and, thus far, unsuccessful one. For every step forward, there have been corresponding, and seemingly inevitable, reverses.

Negotiations on the Iranian issue have been made difficult largely by two factors: the number of players that have a vested interest in this dispute and Iran’s petroleum reserves.

With so many cooks in the kitchen, it is thus far been impossible to maintain a united front. The results have been chaotic and often innocuous. On the one hand, nation-states have been in conflict with one another. U.S. President George W. Bush has asserted that “all options are on the table.” But last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin travelled to the region and retorted: “It is futile to frighten Iran and its people,” and declared the country’s rights to pursue “peaceful nuclear activities.”

In another instance, it was multilateral institutions that bugled proceeding; while the international community eventually came together to pass sanctions against the country, the International Atomic Energy Agency stepped in and reached a deal whereby Tehran would answer questions about its previously shrouded nuclear history—a deal that western diplomats saw as pulling the rug from under their feet.

Domestic interagency feuds are also playing their part to derail the sanctions effort. Late last year, as negotiations on a third round of sanctions against Iran were moving forward at the United Nations, the U.S. intelligence community released its now famous National Intelligence Report – reportedly despite the efforts of Vice President Dick Cheney—which many have speculated was an effort to stop another march to war. (I should note that the British intelligence community has yet to agree with the American assessment, despite analysing the same data.) The NIE report has made the sanctions effort an up-hill battle, and led to a watering down of a third U.N. resolution and allowed the likes of Russia and China to continue with their business dealings with Iran.

With the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, the United Nations, the IAEA, China, Russia and all the other players that are involved in this dispute, coming up with a consistent policy towards Tehran has been an impossibility. It is little wonder that the Persian state has continued with its uranium enrichment in the face of “international pressure.”

Secondly, Iran’s oil and natural gas reserves—third largest and second largest in the world, respectively—have been used by Tehran to weaken and circumvent all efforts to constrain and punish the country. Only days after the release of the NIE, Iran signed $2 billion oil deal with China’s Sinopec. Beijing has also indicated its willingness to take part in a major pipeline project that would bring Iranian gas through Pakistan to the Middle Kingdom. The pressures of maintaining the economic blossoming that is being seen in Asia and the Middle East at the moment is trumping the heartfelt efforts of the U.S. and its western allies, and is another indication that realpolitik is the foreign policy de jour.

As of last week though, we can add a new obstacle to the list. According to reports, Iranian engineers have developed a new type of centrifuge, an integral component in the development of nuclear fuel, which is “more ingenious” than the current P-1 model in use today. Much of Iran’s nuclear program has relied on technologies and designs acquired from the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network. But this disclosure shows that Iran has more domestic knowledge and expertise than was previous thought—and draw into question the assumptions and conclusions of the NIE.

There looks to be one constraining factor: Iran would likely need to import parts from abroad. This means that sanctions still have a part to play as inspections and trade restrictions could stop Tehran from acquiring the necessary parts—despite the fact it has the know-how to enrich uranium. Add to this the fact that Russia has recently made public its concern about Iran’s launch of a rocket, and Germany’s efforts to tamp down its business ties with the country.

The question that remains to be answered is the one that has been hanging over this affair from the beginning: Are these developments a step towards a united international community that will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear technology, or will the obstacles enumerated above be enough for Iran to facture its enemies?